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Summary 
 
There is an ongoing debate about economic problems, macroeconomic and social effects of 
different forms to finance pension insurance: pay -as-you-go vs. funded systems, state vs. 
private. The background of the paper is a report of the World Bank (1 994) about "Averting 
the Old Age Crisis" where a three -pillar system is propagated. Furthermore, because of the 
"double aging" effects, the traditional pension systems face increasing financial problems.   
Privatization combined with funded individual pensions may have several positive 
advantages: a more efficient labor market, higher savings and via extra investment faster 
growth, and faster development of financial markets, combined with financial self -
determination of the citizens.  
In Chapter II, the conc ept of privatization and different possibilities of privatization as well as 
the reasons for privatizing Social Security are summarized. In Chapter III the Social Insurance 
reform of Chile is reviewed shortly: Starting with an overview of the old Social Se curity 
system and its problems, the mandatory saving plan and the Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones (AFPs) are presented. Then the role of the transition rules is described, in particular 
the bonos de reconocimiento and the indexed bonds. This chapter  closes with a preliminary 
statement about the performance of the new system: the rates of return, the costs as well as the 
role of the state's guarantee of a minimum rate of return and a minimum pension.   
The main part (Chapter IV) contains the critical e valuation of the reform (while recognizing 
that the model is still in its "infancy", and some of the early mistakes were amended in later 
stages). This is done in three steps: In the first step (Chapter IV.2), though no econometric 
model is available, the macroeconomic performance of the Chilean economy is reviewed and 
compared with her neighbours', the Western Hemisphere, and the World, with respect to 
growth rates and capital formation. Then the effects on the savings rate, on the rates of return 
as well as on the labor market are presented. In the second step (Chapter IV.3), a finance -
theoretic perspective is taken and the development of capital markets is reviewed using 
different indicators. In the third step (Chapter V) a short critique is presented wit h respect to 
intergenerational redistribution and risk sharing as well as with respect to the social 
consequences of the Chilean reform, taking into account two alternative targets of social 
policy: to avoid poverty in old age and to maintain the standard  of living. Chapter VI contains 
a short summary and some conclusions.   
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I.  Introduction 
Pushed by the World Bank's report on "Averting the Old Age Crisis" (World Bank 1994) and 
the example of Chile, the discussion about the multi - or three-pillar-system of old age security 
is flourishing around the world recently. 
While Chile went first, in 1981, with mandatory individual retirement accounts administered 
by competing fund-management companies, many other countries in the region followed with 
reforms of their own  - Peru in 1993, Columbia in 1994, Argentina in 1994, Uruguay in 1996 
and Mexico in 1997 (see Mitchell/Barreto, 1997, and Queisser, 1998 for overviews of other 
Latin American nations' pension reforms). Changes in Social Security are on the agendas of 
many countries, and since there are differences in financing so cial security, in the state of the 
economy, in the political details etc., topics of discussions vary across countries
1.   
Partial privatization combined with funded individual pensions may have several positive 
advantages: a more efficient labor market, b ecause the distorting social -security tax levied 
only on labor income is replaced; higher savings and therefore extra investment and faster 
growth; as well as faster development of financial markets which in turn may foster economic 
growth. 
As mentioned, several Latin American countries have shown that the reforms can be 
politically feasible and successful, in the following we shall discuss whether those reforms are 
also economically successful. As an example the Chilean reform will be taken because it 
started in 1981, so there are at least almost twenty years of history. Nevertheless the critical 
evaluation of the reform will recognize that the model is still in its "infancy", and that some 
early mistakes were amended in later stages.  
On the other hand the  consequences in relation to social policy or the social dimension of 
these reforms has to be considered. To assess these consequences one needs a measuring rod 
which can be either of the following goals of old age income security: To avoid or to alleviate 
poverty in old age or to secure the standard of living in retirement
2. While in a public PAYG 
social security system different forms of income redistribution, are incorporated, in a 
(compulsory) private system these choices are much more restricted (and on e must rely 
almost entirely on the redistributive power of the tax system).  
 
1 See for an overview Gern (1998). 
2 Cf. e.g. Hauser (1999).  
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However, all these questions will be discussed in the following not primarily within a 
theoretical model but with the help of an empirical example, namely the Chilean economic 
performance. 
The discussion, therefore, will follow these lines: First of all, in section II the different steps 
to privatization as well as the reasons to privatize will be summarized. In the third section a 
"curmudgeon's guide" to the Chilean social security  reform is presented. In the section four 
then follows a discussion of the macroecononomic performance of the Chilean economy in 
particular with respect to growth rates and capital formation, savings, rates of return, and the 
labor market. In the fifth section the performance of the capital markets is evaluated using 
different indicators relating to financial development. The social consequences, in particular 
with respect to income distribution and intergenerational risk sharing, are discussed. The last 
section contains a short summary and some conclusion whether the "Chilean model" is only a 
"historic stroke of good luck" or a model case to be followed not only by "transformation 
countries" but also by industrialized countries. 
 
II. Possible Forms and Ways and Some Reasons for Privatization of Social 
Security 
II.1  Privatization: Forms and Ways 
"Privatization of retirement income means often the replacement of government -managed 
social security by plans with private sector management and private sector inves tment" 
(Turner and Rajnes, 1998, p. 283). 
However, even a mandatory government -managed scheme can rely on capital accumulation, 
originally the German as well as the (old) Chilean social security system were fully-funded 
systems but changed to pay -as-you-go systems in the fifties! Furthermore, government -
managed schemes may have individual capital accounts. Moreover, government intervention 
can take many forms: taxes, transfers, guarantees, regulation, tax incentives etc.   
"Privatization" is a relatively ambiguous concept, nevertheless there seems to be consensus 
that the substitution of one function of the State (or the government) by the private sector is 
part of privatization. Most retirement income schemes maintain however some government 
involvement, sometimes even extensively. The Chilean scheme e.g. incorporates a number of 
State guarantees and tight regulations and therefore is not a purely private system.    
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Furthermore, the notion of privatization is sometimes extended to include supplementary 
occupational or private pension plans, mandatory plans that "replace benefits that would have 
been provided by government" (Turner and Rajnes, 1998, p. 283).  
A measure of privatization of retirement income in this sense, more relying on outcomes than 
on the transformation of governmental functions and institutions, is the percentage of 
retirement income provided by social security (see Figure 1).  
 
Formal arrangements for old age differ in ways that go beyond the type and degree of 
government involvement. Pension s ystems include savings and insurance as well as 
redistribution as important objectives. They may specify either benefits or contributions in 
advance - defined benefit (DB) systems or defined contribution (DC) systems. And they may 
be financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis or on a funded (fully or not) basis (FF). This 
leads to the following distinction between different forms and ways to privatization (see Table 
1). 
Source: World Bank (1994, Figure 7.1.).
Figure 1: Social Security as Percentage of Retirement Income
(selected countries)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Switzerland
Canada
Netherlands
Australia
United States
United Kingdom
Sweden
Germany
Percentage of nonwage income
Mandatory Public Pensions Voluntary occupational pensions
Voluntary Personal Savings 
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Table 1: Forms and Ways to Privatization 
 
  Country 
Form of Privatization  Defined 
contribution 
Defined benefit  Combined  Hybrid Form 
Fully Privatized + 
Mandatory  
Bolivia 
Chile 
Mexico 
     
Fully Privatized and 
Voluntary 
Columbia 
Peru 
     
Partial Mandatory 
Privatization 
Denmark 
Australia 
Finland 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Switzerland  France 
 
Voluntary Partial 
Privatization (or Opting 
Out) 
Argentina  Japan  United Kingdom   
Source: Adapted from Turner and Rajnes (1998, Table 4.2.1).  
The management of investments in a funded scheme may be the most important aspect of 
social security privatization, it is however only one of several functions that can be privatized. 
To see how different functions can be privatized, the Thrift Savings Plan for federal 
government employees in the United States is an illuminating example: The individual worker 
can choose within limits the amount he/she wants to contribute and the assets in which the 
contributions are invested. The government contracts with private investment management 
companies to handle the investment. The government organizes the administration and the 
book keeping, the choice of investment managers, and the menue of possible investments. 
The workers select the investments from this menue. A similar interesting example along 
these lines is the Central Provident Fund of Singapore.  
 
II.2. Some Reasons for Privatization
3  
In the literature several reasons for privatization are put forward. As mentioned above, in 
economics mainly efficiency arguments are at the focal point of all considerations. Besides 
this, however, also very pragmatic reasons were considered. Neve rtheless, considerable 
controversy exists over many of the reasons, therefore, some will be discussed later while 
evaluating the Chilean performance. 
1.  In many countries the contributions to the current social security systems are not sufficient 
to cover expenditures, therefore, large subsidies (or transfers) by the government are 
 
3 Cf. also Turner and Rajnes (1998)  
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necessary. Privatization tends to reduce the need to subsidize the system, therefore reduces 
the government budget and the deficit.  
2.  Many countries face problems in managing defined  benefit systems and think that defined 
contribution systems could be easier to manage  - both financially and politically. 
Competition in privatized services will be more efficient and lead to better quality (than 
the monopolistic management by government).  
3.  Some of the PAYG systems distribute their benefits very inequitably. Since most Latin 
American countries rely or relied heavily on indirect taxation to subsidize social security 
benefits, the poor contribute disproportionately to services they probably wi ll never 
receive. Another aspect of equity is equity across generations in contributions paid and 
benefits received (generational accounting, in particular see Figure 13).  
4.  Many economists conjecture that privatization of social security (a) will tend to ra ise 
domestic savings, (b) will reduce economic distortions in labor markets presumably 
caused by traditional financing methods, and (c) will tend to reduce contribution evasion.   
5.  Demographic changes will raise the dependency ratio (the ratio of beneficiari es NB to 
covered or contributing workers N C) making PAYG systems cet.par. more expensive. 
Given the balance  B C N B W N b ￿ = ￿ ￿ , it follows easily that 
W
B
N
N
b
C
B ￿ = . This means: the 
contribution rate (b) is given by the dependency ratio (N B/NC) times the income-
replacement ratio (B/W; with B = benefits, W =Wage income). Furthermore, the decline 
of the population growth rate and the growth rate of real wages have reduced the implicit 
rate of return of social security contributions, making the  market rates of return (on 
capital) more attractive (cf. Figure 9).  
6.  Some people favour privatization as a means to increase the choice set of the individual, 
and also to move to greater individual responsibility for his/her retirement income.  
7.  Privatization is favoured as a way to develop the private enterprise sector (financial 
services providers, insurance companies) as well as a way to develop capital markets in 
countries with poorly developed capital markets. However, the argument can be put 
differently: privatization is feasible in countries where capital markets have developed up 
to the point where they could provide adequate investment opportunities.    
8.  In some countries privatization is favoured because capital markets show a remarkable 
strength in recent years. On the one hand, the average real rate of return of stocks in the 
United States increased from an average of 6 to 7 percent per year to over 11 percent in  
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the past decade. On the other hand, negative rates of return became less probable and the 
volatility declined. Hence, privatization seems to provide higher benefits for the same 
level of contributions. 
9.  Privatizing social security may be used as a vehicle in privatization of government assets. 
The assets of state  -owned enterprises can be sold t o the privatized social security system!  
10.  In general, the public seems to mistrust the financial operations of the government  - in 
particular as a financial or asset manager.   
 
As mentioned in the World Bank report (World Bank, 1994, p. 255), privatiza tion seems to be 
difficult and more costly, the higher are the "unfunded liabilities" (the implicit social security 
debt) of the existing systems. Furthermore, privatization should not be confounded with 
capital formation or fully-funded systems (see Table 1), because also privatized systems can 
rely on PAYG financing (see e.g. France)
4. And last but not least, some (or most?) of the 
advantages expected from privatization may equally well be gained from reforms within the 
existing social security systems. 
 
III. The Chilean Pension Reform 
III.1 First Steps away from the Old System 
The Chilean pension reform was part of a far reaching social program of modernization, re -
orienting the social and economic order towards the neo -liberal model of Chicago. Besides an 
extreme de-regulation of labor relations in 1978/9 and a wide-reaching privatization of the 
health sector
5, the state drew back widely and transferred also other functions to the private 
sector
6. 
The old Chilean social security system was founded in 1924 as one of the first comprehensive 
social insurance systems outside Europe. With the creation of the Private Employees Social 
Security Fund (EMPART, i.e., Caja de Prevision de Empleados Particulares) and the State 
Workers and Journalists National Social Security Fund (CANAEMPU, i.e. Caja Nacional de 
Empleados Publicos y Periodistas) in 1925, the system expanded rapidly, reaching about 75 
 
4 Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes (1998, p. 140) present a tripartite decomposition, the third component is 
diversification which means "inverting funds (either from the  personel accounts or from Social Security trust 
funds) into a broad range of assets" (139).   
5 Cf. Sapelli (1999). 
6 On the global Chilean reforms see Bosworth et al. (1994) and Edwards and Edwards (1991).   
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percent of the labor force in 1979. However, the system was widely differentiated according 
to industries and professions  (32 institutions with over 100 different regimes) with many 
inefficient bureaucracies (see Mesa-Lago, 1989). Owing to political "gifts", over -generous 
benefit and eligibility provisions, and wide-spread evasion, contribution rates were very high 
and pensions very dispersed.   
Table 2: Contributors to the Old Pension System in 1980 
Institutions  Number of contributors  % Total 
Servicio de Seguro Social 
EMPART 
CANAEMPU 
Other 
1,394,300 
430,000 
264,200 
138,400 
62.61 
19.31 
11,86 
6.22 
Total  2,226,900  100.00 
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p. 19).  
Table 3: Pension Contribution Rates (% over Imposable Salary) 
SSS  EMPART   CANAEMPU   Year 
Cont. (1)  Empl.(2)  Total  Cont. (1)  Empl.(2)   Total  Cont.(1)  Empl.(2)  Total 
1968-1973  7.25  14.25  21.50  9.00  17.00  26.00  11.00  5.00  16.00 
1974-1977  7.25  15.95  23.20  9.00  17.00  26.00  11.00  5.00  16.00 
1978  7.25  15.95  23.20  10.16  15.00  25.16  11.00  5.00  16.00 
1979-1980  7.25  15.70  22.95  10.16  14.75  24.91  11.00  4.75  15.75 
(1) Contributors. 
(2) Employers. 
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p. 19). 
The system experienced severe financial imbalances, and several attempts to unify the system 
followed. Furthermore, high inflation eroded most of the accumulated reserves. Therefore, 
when the Pinochet government took power in 1973, s everal gradual changes to the pension 
schemes were made: raising retirement age to 65 for men and to 60 years for women; 
introducing a uniform minimum pension as well as a uniform indexation mechanism; 
abolishing all pension regimes based on years of service.  
Despite these reforms, contributions  - ranging from 16 percent for public sector and 26 
percent for white collar employees in the private sector (see Table 3)  - covered less than 70 
percent of expenditures. Between 1977 and 1980, direct fiscal contrib utions grew at a rate of  
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8.5 percent per year, reaching 2.7 percent of GDP in 1980. To prepare for the more 
fundamental reform in 1981, the Chilean government took steps during 1974 -1979 to build up 
a remarkable budget surplus (see World Bank, 1994, p. 268). 
 
III. 2. The Mandatory Scheme 
In 1981, a fully-funded defined-contribution scheme with individual pension accounts was 
introduced (see for a short description Queisser (1995) and Edwards (1996)).   
The centerpieces of the reform are a privatized compulsa ry savings plan together with a 
market for indexed annuities to convert capital accounts into retirement income. The system is 
administered by private pension funds, the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP), 
which compete for members. The new syste m allows the workers to choose the AFP they 
want to affiliate with, and to transfer their accumulated funds among them (twice a year). 
Membership is mandatory for new entrants into the labor force and optional for self -
employed. The new system emphasizes u niformity of contributions and its structure of 
benefits, therefore, every private or public -sector employee contributes 10 percent of his 
monthly income (subject to a ceiling of about US -$ 1,500 monthly) and on average 3 percent 
for invalidity and survivors' insurance. This insurance is bought on a group basis by the AFP 
with private insurance companies. Contributions and benefits are exempt from the income tax; 
workers can make additional voluntary contributions (in particular to a so -called Voluntary 
Saving Account (VSA)) which are subject to taxation only when they are withdrawn. 
Furthermore, these funds are not taken into consideration when determining the State 
minimum pension guarantee. 
Every AFP manages only one fund, and the returns are credited to  the personal accounts 
minus the fees charged by the AFP for its services.  
The employers pay no contribution. The contribution of employers within the old system was 
redeemed by a once-and-for-all increase in gross wages. The contribution rate of employers 
within the old system were on average 16 percent (see Table 3), and the increase in income 
was 17 percent, i.e. 10 percent for old age security and 7 percent for health insurance
7. 
Upon retirement (fixed by law at 65 for men and 60 years for women), member s can choose 
either to purchase an annuity with a life insurance company or to negotiate a phased with -
 
7 The total contribution rate of employers (for p ensions, health benefits and labor accident) however ranged from 
14 percent (CANAEMPU) over 25,95 percent (SSS) to 28, 71 percent (EMPART) (see Superintendency, 1999, 
Table I.1, p. 18)!  
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drawal of their balance with the AFP. Early retirement is possible if the balance of the 
individual pension account is sufficient to provide for an annuity at least 50 percent of the 
previous wage income (subject to the above -mentioned ceiling). A minimum pension is 
guaranteed by the state to all members who have contributed for at least 20 years to the new 
scheme but whose balances are not sufficient to r each the minimum pension throughout the 
retirement period. Therefore, the government also guarantees the minimum pension to those 
individuals who, having apted for a phased withdrawal, outlive  the program and exhaust their 
accumulated funds. Furthermore,  the state guarantees the contractual obligations of the AFPs 
and insurance companies up to the minimum pension and thereafter 75 percent up to a 
maximum level. 
The AFPs are licensed and regulated by the AFP Superintendency. An AFP can be 
established by any groups of shareholders; but they are allowed to operate or manage only one 
pension fund for all its affiliates. The AFP has a minimum capital requirement (US-$ 
160,000) which rises, however, with the number of affiliates. There is strict regulation of the  
capital stock, however, the regulation has been gradually relaxed in recent years. The Chilean 
system imposes a maximum and a minimum rate of return, set in relation to the average 
performance of the whole system over the last twelve months
8. The AFPs charge fixed fees 
and commissions related to the covered wages for the services, in 1996 on average 3 percent 
of the base salary or 10 percent of contributions! The importance of the fixed fees (on average 
1.5 percent) is declining. 70 percent of total fees a re for management, 30 percent for sales and 
marketing. Compared to other systems, e.g. in the U.S.A., the scheme is criticized as being 
relatively expensive
9. Despite high competition between the AFPs, so their number declined 
from more than 20 in the mid-eighties to 8 in 1998, the operating costs remained high: Instead 
of reducing commissions, the AFPs have spent more on advertising and sales agents
10.  
III.3. Transition Arrangements 
Most of the discussion about privatizing pensions is turning around the tr ansition 
arrangements: "The costs of a transition from one system of old age security to another are 
large" (World Bank, 1994, p. 255). Even in many theoretical analyzes there remains a "double 
burden" at least for one generation (cf. Breyer, 1989). This b urden falls on the working 
population, who has to pay the pensions of the old system and the contributions for their own 
 
8 The minimum rate, e.g. is equal to the average of all AFPs minus 2 p ercent or 50 percent of the average real 
rate of return of all AFPs, depending on what is lower.  
9 See Diamond (1998, pp. 54-55) for some cost calculation.  
10 The number of sales agents, e.g. increased from 1.882 in 1982 to 17.448 in 1997 (see Superintenden cy, 1999, 
p. 226).  
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capital accounts. But, first and most important, efficiency gains can and should be used to pay 
off the implicit debt behind the value  of expected benefit rights of the elderly (see e.g. 
Homburg and Richter, 1990, and Belan, Michel and Pestieau, 1998).  
Additional debt reduction comes from the reform of the social security itself, e.g. by raising 
the retirement age and by eliminating the  early and special retirement regimes. "What remains 
of the debt can be financed by issuing government bonds, cutting other government 
expenditures, selling public assets, or raising tax rates. The methods chosen will determine 
savings, growth, and the gene rational distribution of the benefits and costs of the transition" 
(World Bank, 1994, pp. 266-267). 
The Chilean government privatized more then 500 firms in two rounds  - the first from 1974 to 
1982, the second from 1985 through 1992, while between 1982 and  1984 there "was a partial 
reversal in the process" when the government had to take over more than 50 banks and firms 
that failed in the recession of 1981-1982 (see Edwards, 1996, p. 3). 
In Chile, upon establishment of the new AFP -system in 1981, the members of the old pension 
system (who had not already retired when the new system was introduced) were given the 
choice of remaining in the public system or to switch to one of the private AFP.   
Current and future pensions for those members who had already ret ired or have chosen to stay 
with the old system are financed from current contributions to the public scheme and from the 
general treasury. 
For those who moved to the new scheme, the accumulated entitlements were paid off by an 
immediate issue of "recognition bonds" ('bonos de reconocimiento'). These recognition bonds 
were supposed to equal the expected present value of the benefits these workers had thus far 
earned. However, calculating the social security entitlement is difficult in developing 
countries where employment records are incomplete. Therefore, the recognition bonds are 
rated so as to equal the present value of a pension replacing, for a full contribution period, 80 
percent of the member's average income in the 12 months prior to June 1979 (see Q ueisser, 
1995, p. 27; Edwards, 1996, p. 26).  
The recognition bonds were nontransferable, are adjusted to inflation and earn 4 percent real 
interest, and are redeemable for lump sum payments into the workers' mandatory savings 
account upon retirement (or i nvalidity or death).  
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III.4 A Preliminary Statement about Performance
11 
The annual deficit resulting from subsidies to current pension payments and recognition 
bonds started at 0.6 percent of GDP in 1981, raised gradually to 4.8 percent in 1991 (see 
World Bank 1994, Box Table 8.5, p. 268), and is now expected to decline thereafter, "as older 
retirees die". The pension debt will gradually diminish until the last covered retiree dies and 
the last worker with a recognition bond retires, around 2025.  
The subsidy to the Pension Normalization Institute (INP), the central administration of the 
still existing different old regimes (with different contribution rates and benefit levels), has 
been fluctuating around 3 percent of GDP (see Superintendency 1999, Table II. 3). These costs 
will, however, decline rapidly because of life expentancy in Chile. In September 1998, the old 
pension system still had around 300,000 contributors (or 4 percent of the labor force) and paid 
benefits to about 1 million pensioners. 
The new AFP scheme consisted in the first year of 13 AFPs with 1.4 million persons  - 38 
percent of the labor force  - enrolled. 1993 the system expanded to 25 AFPs with a total of 5 
million members, corresponding to a coverage of almost 95 percent of the Chilean lab or 
force. In Sept. 1998 the number of affiliates is above 5.8 millions, and after a process of 
mergers and acquisitions, the number of AFPs was 10. (For a short summary of the AFP 
industry's development see Appendix A.) However, the share of contributors h as been 
declining steadily, from 65 percent in 1982 to less than 55 percent in 1998. These figures are 
shown in Table 4 for some selected years.   
Table 4: Evolution of Affiliates and Contributors (selected years) 
New Pension System
1)   Year 
No. of Affiliates  No. of Contributors  
Pension Normalization In-
stitute (former SS Funds)
2)  
1979  -  -  2,291,184 
1981  1,400,000  -  731,939 
1982  1,440,000  1,060,000  488,856 
1985  2,283,830  1,558,194  454,409 
1989  3,470,845  2,267,622   
1994  5,014,444  2,879,637   
1997  5,780,400  3,296,361   
1) Up to Dec. each year  
2) Annual Average 
Source: Superintendency (1999, Table II.1 and Table V.1).  
 
11 See Superintendency of AFPs (1999).   
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Several reasons are responsible for this decline: on the one hand pensioners, who chose the 
phased withdrawal of their balance, count sti ll as members but don't pay contributions, on the 
other hand loss of a job or withdrawal from the labor force, and non -payment of contributions 
by self-employed affiliates, who contribute on a voluntary basis.   
The number of pensioners in the AFP system is  still very low; in Sept. 1998 only 282 757 
pensions have been processed (see Figure 2).   
 
In 1998 the AFPs managed assets of more than US -$ 28 Billion, corresponding to 40 percent 
of GDP (see for the evolution Figure 3). The investment portfolio (end of  1997) was 
composed of 40 percent government bonds, 23 percent equities, 17 percent mortgages, 5 
percent corporate bonds, and 15 percent other instruments (see for a comparison between 
1981 and 1998, Figure 4). 
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p.134).
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From the beginning of the AFP system the co mposition of the AFPs' investment was highly 
regulated. In early 1985 Pension Funds were allowed to invest up to 30 percent of their 
resources in corporate stock of formerly State -owned companies in the process of 
privatization. The greater depth of the ca pital market following the privatization let to an 
increase in investments in private corporations' stock. Another change took place in 1990, 
when Pension Funds were allowed to engage in stock investments in corporations with a 
concentrated ownership and i n foreign instruments. "A significant change in regulations 
governing Pension Funds investments is included in the so -called Capital Market Act, which 
amended investment limits and increased the number of eligible instruments" 
(Superintendency, 1999, p. 140). An overview is given in Table 5. 
        Figure 4: Changes in AFPs Portfolios
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p. 220).
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Figure 3: Pension Funds Evolution 
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Table 5: Limits per Instrument before and after the Capital Market Amendment Act
1) 
Before Amendment   After Amendment 
Range  Range 
 
Instrument 
Lower Limit  Upper Limit  Lower Limit  Upper Limit 
1. State-Issued   0 %  45 %  35 %  50 % 
2. Financial Inst. Deposits and 
Bonds 
3. Titles Guaranteed by Financial 
Institutions 
40 % if at least 
1/4 has expiry 
date beyond one 
year. 30 % if 
expiry term is £ 
one year 
 
 
 
100 % 
 
 
 
30 % 
 
 
 
50% 
4. Credit Bills issued by Financial 
Institutions 
40 %  100 %  35 %  50 % 
5. Bonds from Public and Private 
Companies 
-  - 
6. Convertible Bonds from Public 
and Private Companies 
 
30 % 
 
100 % 
10 % 
 
30 % 
15 % 
 
50 % 
7a. Stocks from Open 
      Corporations Subject to  
      Chapter XII of DL 3.500  
 
10 % 
 
30 % 
7b. Stocks from Open 
      Corporations not subject to  
      Chapter XII of DL 3.500  
 
10 % 
 
 
20 % 
 
30 % 
 
 
40 % 
 
 
30 % 
 
 
40 % 
8. Real Estate Corporate Stock   10 %  20 %  30 %  40 %  -  - 
9. Real Estate Closed Mutual  10 %  10 %  20 %  20%  - 
 
10 %  - 
 
20 % 
10. Shares of Corporate 
Development Closed Mutual 
Funds + the Amount of inputs 
committed via promissory con-
tracts of subscription and pay -
ment of C.D.C.M.F. accounts  
 
 
 
0 % 
 
 
 
5 % 
 
 
 
2 % 
 
 
 
5 % 
 
11. Shares in Personalty Closed 
Mutual Funds 
10 % 
 
 
 
10 % 
20 % 
 
 
 
20 % 
5 %  10 % 
12. Shares in Securitized-Credit 
Closed Mutual Funds  
Non-eligible instruments  5 %  10 % 
13. Negotiable Instruments repre -
senting Bills of Exchange or 
Promissory Notes with Expiry 
term £ one year. 
 
 
10 % 
 
 
100 % 
 
 
10 % 
 
 
20 % 
10 % 
Fixed-
Income 
6 % 
Fixed- 
Income  
12 % 
Fixed- 
Income  
14. Credit titles, securities and ne-
gotiable Instruments issued or 
guaranteed by Foreign States, 
Foreign Banks and Central 
Banks, and Shares, Stocks and 
Bonds issued by foreign compa-
nies, open and closed mutual 
funds; and hedging operations 
of the instruments noted in this 
number.      
 
 
 
 
 
0 % 
Varia-
ble 
Income 
Non-
eligible 
 
 
 
 
 
10 % 
3 % 
Varia-
ble 
Income 
 
 
 
 
 
6 % 
 
6 % 
Varia-
ble 
Income 
 
 
 
 
 
12 % 
15. Hedging Instruments-Domestic  Non-eligible instruments  5 %  15 % 
16. Pension Funds Shares  20 %  100 %  Non-eligible instruments 
17. Others authorized by the Central 
Bank, whose issuers are surveil-
led by the Superintendency of 
Securities and Insurances or by 
the Superintendency of Banks 
and Financial Institutions.  
 
 
Non-eligible instruments 
 
 
1 % 
 
 
5 % 
1) Limits mentioned in the 'After Amendment' column may be found in the so -called Capital 
Market Act of 1994. 
Source: Superintendency (1999, Table V. 6 (resp. Table III.2)).    
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At the end of 1994, th e maximum limit for investment abroad was 10 percent of total assets (it 
is now 20 percent), but AFPs invested less than 1 percent in these assets. Only recently, AFPs 
raised their share of foreign assets to 5 percent.   
Private capital markets have flourished since 1981: When the new contributions to the AFPs 
substituted for the former "wage tax", then a new market for financial assets (inclusive 
government bonds) was created. Even when private savings decline in proportion to the new 
compulsory savings, the composition of portfolios is different: Shares and bonds subsitute for 
bank credits and deposits. Even 1994 the AFPs kept 55 percent of governments bonds, 62 
percent of outstanding mortgage credits, 59 percent of industry bonds, and 11 percent of all 
shares. 
Since the introduction of the system, the AFPs have achieved an annual real rate of return of 
15.9 percent (from 1982 through 1994) or of 11 percent (up to 1998), fluctuating between 
44.5 percent in 1983 and  - 2.7 percent in 1995 with a standard deviation of 11.63 (resp. 
12.06). This has been partly due to the fact that government subsidies to the financial system 
shielded the pension funds during the 1983-1984 financial crash, the pension funds, however, 
reaped all the benefits of the recovery startin g in the late eighties. The real annual rate of 
return of 1998 is expected to be negative. For a more detailed review of the rates of return of 
different AFPs see Appendix B.  
The Superintendency (see Superintendency, 1999, pp. 151 -152) calculates an annual real (UF-
deflated)
12 share yield, reflecting the profitability of the investments by the AFPs. It is 
identical to all affiliates of an AFP and independent of the accrued balance and the 
commissions collected. "This yield, measured in annual terms, is the p ercentage variation in 
the average value of the share [the value of which increases or decreases depending on the 
economic, or market, value of investments] in any given month, as compared with the average 
monthly value of that share in the same month of t he previons year" (ibid, 151 and note 61). 
This yield peaked in 1991, reaching 29.7 percent, with a trough of merely  - 2.5 percent in 
1995. For 1998 the value end Sept. is  - 9.6 (see Figure 5). However, there is an almost 5 -
percentage-points difference in  the after-tax rate of return between low wage earner and the 
top earner, as reported by Diamond (1997, p. 288).    
 
12 UF (= unidad de fomento), Chile's indexed unit of account.   
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Source: Superintendency (1999, p.152) for 1998: http://www.safp.cl/  
The "money stream" into the AFPs and the relatively favourable rates of  return in the 1980s 
are certainly determined endogenously. The short time period since the implementation in 
1981 reflects the "immature character" of the system whose growth rates are high. 
Furthermore, real rates of interest were decreasing, leading to s udden increases in some share 
prices and, therefore, high capital gains. Thus, the question remains, how such a system will 
perform when it is "mature"! Also the demographic changes so far were advantageous.  
However, the "normal" development of interest r ates shows high rates (see Tables 6 and 
Figure 6). Considering only the interest rate of deposites in 1997 (12 percent), subtracting the 
inflation rate (6 percent in 1997), yields a real interest rate of 6 percent. Comparing this figure 
with the rate of re turn of the AFPs of 4 percent in the same year, then the "gloriole" 
disappears. Furthermore, the high real returns of the new Chilean AFP system in 1981 
through 1990 is not exceptional: It reflects only similar developments in other securities 
markets around the world. 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF) (1998, p. 109).  
Figure 5: Real Annual UF-Deflated Share Yield
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Table/Figure 6: Interest Rates in Chile -- Deposit Rate/Lending Rate in % p.a.
Deposit Rate Lending Rate
1980 37,72 47,14
1981 40,9 52,02
1982 48,68 63,86
1983 28,01 42,82
1984 27,63 38,33
1985 31,97 40,81
1986 18,99 26,27
1987 25,22 32,8
1988 15,11 21,17
1989 27,72 35,92
1990 40,27 48,83
1991 22,32 28,55
1992 18,26 23,92
1993 18,24 24,3
1994 15,08 20,34
1995 13,73 18,16
1996 13,46 17,37
1997 12,02 15,67
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IV. Critical Evaluation of the Chilean Pension Reform 
IV. 1 Preliminary Notes 
In the following, my critical remarks will be related to two sets of key macroeconomic 
questions
13. First, the welfare effects: How does privatization affect the relation between 
market interest rates, capital formation and economic growth? In answering this question the 
demographic changes have to be taken into account, because there are diffe rent effects caused 
alone by a reduction in population growth.  
In simple models the "Aaron proposal" (cf. Aaron, 1966) holds: A PAYG system is "cheaper" 
(i.e. in a stationary equilibrium the contribution rate necessary for a given benefit level is 
lower) than a fully-funded scheme, if the interest rate is lower than the natural growth rate 
(defined as growth rate of the population plus productivity growth) or the growth rate of 
wages. This point has sometimes been discussed with reference to "dynamic ineffi ciency", 
where individuals are so eager to save that market rates of return fall below the population 
plus wage growth rate. Therefore, except under practically irrelevant conditions (cf. Abel et 
al., 1989), the implicit "return" of social security contribution is below comparable market 
rates of return. 
In an ongoing social security system, the burden borne by the current generation depends 
upon the distance between the market rate of return and the population plus productivity 
growth rates. And it is not  surprising that social security has been cast more and more under 
attack as population growth and wage or productivity growth have declined. But, is this not a 
historic "windfall gain"? Dynamic economies with relatively high government indebtedness 
(as a demand on the capital market) lead to relatively high average rates of return. However, 
the widespread attempts in reforming public budgets (i.e. the reduction of new indebtedness 
below the "3 percent line" of GDP) in combination with a declining population  may well lead 
to declining real interest rates. However, the conversion of the "implicit social security debt" 
can compensate for this shortfall and contribute to the flourishing of (world -wide) capital 
markets. 
The second set of questions raised here, re lates to the distributional and risk-sharing question: 
How does a certain policy proposal affect the expected cash flows between different 
generations and the government, how are the macroeconomic risks allocated across 
 
 
13 That does not mean, that microeconomic questions are not important for Social Security reforms (see e.g. 
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996)), they are only beyond the scope of this paper.   
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generations, and how does the govern ment affect the sharing of such risks (cf. Bohn, 1997)? 
These questions are only briefly commented on in the following chapter V, mostly because 
there is no empirical evidence at hand. 
To answer the first set of questions, a first -rate solution here would  be to develop a 
macroeconomic model of an open economy in which it is possible to explicitly incorporate 
the transition from a social security-defined benefit (PAYG-DB) system to a fully-funded, 
defined-contribution (FF-DC) scheme. On this basis the main effects of the reform could be 
formulated: First, the reform affects positively national savings and capital accumulation, and 
hence contributes to economic growth. Second, the reform enhances and accelerates financial 
market developments and thus the effic iency allocation. Third, the reform reduces labor 
market distortions, because a closer link between contributions and benefits is introduced, and 
thus may result in higher labor market participation. In the next step, this model should then 
be tested econo metrically using data of Chile before and after the social security reform. This 
task, however, seems impossible, at least for me (but see Appendix C for a simple 
overlapping-generations model). In the following the most important variables will be 
identified, and then a non-structural approach is chosen: Instead of testing a particular theory 
(or model) to explain the macroeconomic relationship, a comprehensive statistical picture will 
be given. This "method of inspection" is less rigorous than desirable a nd mostly relies on 
"proof by assurance". Nevertheless, there are important results.  
Furthermore,  there exists a more basic problem. As mentioned above, the social security 
reform was part of a "landmark reform" starting in the mid  - 1970s. These structural reforms 
and the stabilization program – coupled with a severe shock in the terms of trade (e.g. higher 
oil prices and a collapse of copper prices)  – "led to a harsh recession ... followed by several 
years of strong economic recovery... The euphoria came  to an abrupt end in 1981, when the 
economy again collapsed ... The resulting recession was among the most severe in all Latin 
America: unemployment, including workers in special government-subsidized employment 
programs, rose to 30 percent of the labor for ce in 1983 ..."(Bosworth, Dornbusch, Labau, 
1994, pp. 1-2). However, since 1983 Chile has achieved a sustained strong economic 
expansion: unemployment has declined; inflation, while still high, is below the rates that 
existed in the 70s and below the rates  in other Latein America countries. "To a great extent, 
the growth of the Chilean economy during the 1980s should be viewed as a recovery from an 
extreme depression, fueled by high levels of surplus labor" (as Marfan/Bosworth, 1994, p. 
165 remark). Therefore, it seems impossible to attribute or to credit the social security reforms 
with this development (see Table 7 for an overview of some macroeconomic indicators).   
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Table 7: Chile: Macroeconomic Indicators 1970-1997 
Macroeconomic Indicators   1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
                                 
GDP Growth (real)  2,1  9  -1,2  -5,6  1 -13,3  3,2  8,3  7,8  7,1  7,8  5,5 -14,1  -0,7  6,4 
Inflation - CPI (Dec. To 
Dec.) 
34,9  22,1 163,3 508,4 375,9 340,7 174,3  63,5  30,3  38,9  31,2  9,5  20,7  23,1  23 
Unemployment rate  5,7  3,9  3,3  5  9,5  14,9  12,7  11,8  14,2  13,6  10,4  11,3  19,6  14,6  13,9 
Gross capital formation to 
GDP 
16,4  14,5  12,2  7,9  21,2  13,1  12,8  14,4  17,8  17,8  21  22,7  11,3  9,8  13,6 
Gross savings rate  17,1  13,5  8,7  6,1  21,8  11,1  17,1  12,6  14,5  15  16,8  12,4  9,4  12,5  12,6 
Macroeconomic Indicators   1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997     
GDP Growth (real)  2,5  5,6  6,6  7,3  10,6  3,7  8  12,3  7  5,7  10,6  7,4  7,1     
Inflation - CPI (Dec. To 
Dec.) 
26,4  17,4  21,5  12,7  21,4  27,3  18,7  12,7  12,2  8,9  8  7  6     
Unemployment rate  12  8,8  7,9  6,3  5,3  5,7  5,3  4,4  4,5  7,9  7,3  6,4  6,1     
Gross capital formation to 
GDP 
17,2  18,9  22,2  22,8  25,1  25,1  22,6  23,8  26,5  24,1  25,8  26,6  26,9     
Gross savings rate  19,6  21,9  25,1  29,7  29,8  28,4  27  25,2  24,1  25,4  27,6  24,7  25     
Data in percent.       
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Monthly Bulletin; International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
 
IV. 2 Macroeconomic Evaluation 
IV. 2. 1 Effects on Economic Growth and Capital Formation 
Kotlikoff (1996) examines the impact of social-security privatization. The pre-privatization 
economy shows the following characteristics: a progressive income tax, government 
consumption of 20 percent of output, a 12 percent social -security payroll tax, no linkage 
between social-security benefits and taxes, zero initial official government debt, a 1 percent 
population growth rate, zero technical change, a Cobb -Douglas production function, a CES -
utility function in consumption and leisure with inter- and intratemporal elasticities of 
substitution of 0.25 and 0.8, respectively, and a time preference rate of 1.5 percent. And 
current generations are made no worse off by the reform.      
The simulation phases out social-security benefits in a linear manner over a 45-year period, 
while this phase-out period starts 11 years after eliminating the payroll tax. This permits all 
beneficiaries at the time of the reform to collect all their benefits. Social -security benefits 
during transition are financed by a proportional consumption tax ! The government uses lump-
sum taxes and transfers to redistribute across generations during the transition.  
The effects of privatization in this simulation model depend largely upon (a) the nature of the 
pre-existing income tax, (b) the perceived benefit -tax linkage in the initial social security 
system, (c) the type of transition tax employed, and (d) whether the welfare of the current 
generations is protected by compensatory policies.    
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The upper part of Figure 7 shows that "privatization of social -security can generate substantial 
long-run increases in output, capital stock, and real wages despite the fact that the initial 
elderly are compensated for their higher fiscal burden arising from the consumption tax" 
(Kotlikoff, 1996, p. 370). The capital stock  would increase by 6.5 percent after 10 years, 14 
percent after 25 years, and 21 percent after 50 years.  
The lower part of Figure 7 shows  the efficiency gain equivalent to a 4 percent increase in the 
annual consumption and leisure levels for all generations born after year 0. The intuition for 
these results is simple: An unlinked social-security payroll tax combined with a progressive 
income tax is highly distortive. Privatization of social-security immediately links marginal 
retirement saving (whether compu lsory or not) to marginal retirement income and reduces the 
total effective marginal tax on labor supply (Kotlikoff, 1996, p. 370).  
"Efficiency gains from privatization are, however, not guaranteed" (ibid). The same model 
produces a 3 percent  utility loss for all future generations when (a) the old social -security 
scheme is perfectly linked at the margin, and (b) income taxation is used to finance 
transitional benefits. "The efficiency loss here results from the increased labor supply and 
savings distortions arising from the temporarily higher rate of income taxation" (ibid). Since 
social security currently provides (at least in Germany, but also in other major countries) 
partial but incomplete linkage, the effects of privatization should lie somewhere betwe en 
these two sets of results. Kotlikoff (1996) also shows that using debt to finance part of the 
transition costs will generally reduce the short - and medium-term effects on saving.  
 
Figure 7: Proportional Consumption-Tax Finance of Benefits and Progressive  
     Income-Tax Finance of General Revenues 
Notes: K = capital stock, Y = output, w = real wages, and r = real interest rate.  
Source: Kotlikoff (1996, p. 370).  
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Comparing these simulation results
14 with the actual performance of Chile is  – as noted earlier 
– premature. However, the overall picture points in this direction: Savings first fell due to 
government borrowing and to a severe recession, but then increased, also gross fixed capital 
formation rose, leading to a rise in GDP (see Tables 7 and 9). B ut the picture is somehow 
"mixed" because first, there was still high growth in Chile before the Social security reform 
and a sharp fall shortly after the reform. But overall the average growth rate of the period 
1970-1981 was 2.79 percent and for 1982 to  1997 it was 5.38 percent. Also, compared to her 
neighbors, Chile shows on average higher growth rates (Table/Figure 8). However, as 
remarked by Marfan/Bosworth (1994, p. 165), "it is surprising that the benefits of economic 
liberalization are not more evident in an improved efficiency of resource use as measured by 
either the level of labor productivity or the joint productivity of capital and labor".  
Whereas between 1950 and 1973, Chile ranked near the bottom of all the surveyed 
(seventeen) countries, with  an annual rate of growth in output per worker of 2.9 percent 
(compared to the average for LA with 3.3 percent); of that growth, 1.8 percentage points can 
be attributed to increased capital intensity (capital per worker or capital -labor substitution) 
and 1.1 percentage points to technical progress. In the period 1973 to 1989, the performance 
of output per worker is even worse, falling off to only 0.6 percent a year
15, and 0.4 resp. 0.2 
can be attributed to increased capital intensity resp. total factor produ ctivity (see Table 4-1 of 
Marfan/Bosworth, 1994).  
IV. 2. 2. Effects on National Savings Rate 
One of the primary reasons cited for privatization of social security is that it would boost the 
national savings rate and capital accumulation. However, raising  the savings rate does not 
necessarily imply an increase in the welfare of households. In an economy with taxes and 
market imperfections, households might save to overcome those imperfections, regardless of 
the tax distortions on intertemporal substitution  of consumption (see Engen and Gale, 1997, 
and the discussion): There may exist unfair private annuity markets, liquidity constraints of 
households, no insurance against income risks etc.   
 
14 An OLG model calibrated to the Chilean reform results in an increase in GDP after 200 years of 3 to 5 percent, 
compared to the base -line scenario, when the transition generation is burdened twice by repaying t he implicit 
debt via higher transitory taxation; cf. Arrau and Schmidt -Hebbel (1993). 
15 However, the average for Latin America is even smaller, which is due to negative developments in Argentina 
and Venezuela.  
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Table/Figure 8: LA-MIX -- GDP at constant prices 
GDP, percent change over previous year, calculated from Indices  
  CHILE  ARGENT  BRASIL  MEXICO   
1980  7,8  1,5  9,2  8,3   
1981  5,5  -5,7  -4,2  8,5   
1982  -14,1  -3,1  0,8  -0,6   
1983  -0,7  3,7  -2,9  -3,5   
1984  6,4  2,4  6,4  3,4   
1985  2,5  -7  7,5  2,2   
1986  5,6  7,1  7  -3,1   
1987  6,6  2,5  3,4  1,7   
1988  7,3  -2  -0,1  1,3   
1989  10,6  -7  4  4,2   
1990  3,7  -1,3  0,9  5,1   
1991  8  10,5  0,9  4,2   
1992  12,3  10,3  -0,9  3,6   
1993  7  6,3  6  2   
1994  5,7  8,5  4,9  4,4   
1995  10,6  -4,6  3,9  -6,2   
1996  7,4  4,3  3  5,2   
1997  7,1  8,4    7   
 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF) (1998, pp. 156-157). 
Social security provides insurance against many risks (length of life, disability, earnings 
capacity, income shocks over lifetime, family size etc.), thus, simply noting that other 
personal saving was reduced after introducing social security, or that it is likely to increase 
under privatization, is an incomplete if not misleading way in welfare analysis. 
Even taken for granted that national savings are lower in countries with a PAYG social 
security than in a country with a fully-funded social security system (and if there were no 
payments to the first generation of pensioners), this does not mean that the transition to a 
funded system is accompanied with higher savings  – when the implicit debt is financed by 
issuing recognition bonds: Assuming government spending remains unchanged, private 
households have no precautionary motive for saving, receive the same expected value of 
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future benefits, and face the same expected future taxes, then with no chan ge in national 
output, current private consumption, and thus national savings would be unchanged. "This 
occurs because the interest payments on the increased explicit national debt are a transfer 
from young to old which exactly replaces the transfer under  the old, unfunded Social Security 
system" (Mitchell/Zeldes, 1996, p. 366). Relaxing some of these assumptions could, 
therefore, change saving (cf. also Appendix C, proposition 4).   
The performance of the Chilean economy in the last half of the 1970s shows  an excess 
demand for saving, resulting in raising (domestic) interest rates and an increasing current 
account deficit. The debt crisis of 1982 interrupted the inflow of foreign financing. In a 
nutshell, while the recovery in 1975-1981 was mainly financed by credits from abroad, the 
recovery of 1985-1991 seems to be financed mainly by resources from the growing pension 
funds (see Morandé, 1998, pp. 222 sqq.).   
The national savings rate raised from extremely low levels of around 9 percent of GDP in 
1982 to 12.6 percent in 1984, up to 18.9 percent in 1986, and peaked in 1989 with nearly 30 
percent, mostly through an increase in public sector savings. In fact, between 1980 and 1985 
net savings were negative, and only in 1986 became positive. The increased nation al savings 
provide the funds needed for investment, and substitute for external savings, which are highly 
volatile. In a certain sense, high saving rates have "immunized" Chile to the 'tequila effect' 
("Mexican Crisis") in 1995 and 1996. 
For the investment rate there is a similar picture: In nominal prices, the investment rate kept 
relatively constant through the 1970s and early 1980s. In the beginning of the 1980s the 
investment rate was declining to 11 and 10 percent, to grow from here up to 25.1 percent  in 
1989; since then the investment rate is oscillating around 23 to 25 percent (see Table 7).  
At the start of the reform, the public deficit increased (see Fig./Table 6), because the receipts 
of the wage tax in the old system were falling caused by the shi ft of contributors to the new 
AFP system. This reduction was not balanced by the contributions to the new system, 
however, because the contribution rates were lower than "combined employer -employee 
contribution rates" of the old system. Therefore, most of  the public deficit is stemming from 
government's obligations towards "old" retirees. These costs start declining rather rapidly, 
however, after 1995 because of life expectancy in Chile (cf. Edwards, 1998, p. 27). 
Nevertheless, the effects of an increase in  the public deficit upon macroeconomic savings 
were nearly compensated by the surplus of the new system. The remaining part reflects the 
increase in labor income, leading probably to an increase in private consumption. Thus, the 
increase in the public deficit overvalues the expansionary effect of the social security reform.   
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Whether the Chilean pension reform has actually increased private savings directly, is still an 
open question. Marfan and Bosworth (1994) as well as Holzmann (1996) find that, 
privatization appears to have contributed directly to only a small portion (between 3.3 percent 
in 1990-92 or between 2 and 3 percent in 1991 -1995) of the rise in national savings to date 
(see Table 9 for a splitting up of saving and investment).  
However, the govern ment undertook a series of economic reforms which probably raised the 
growth rate, and in turn the savings rate. In the same vain worked the indirect effect of 
deepening financial markets. Both factors may have risen private, non -pension saving as 
reported by Morfan and Bosworth (1994). And a significant portion of the increase in national 
savings was due to increased public saving (see Kotlikoff, 1996).  
Table 9: Components of Saving and Investment, Selected Periods, 1974-92 
Item  1974-78  1979-81  1982-85  1986-89  1990-92
a 
Components of/investment
b           
Change in inventories    2.2    6.1   -1.6    1.4    2.1 
Fixed capital formation  14.6  17.6  14.0  16.8  19.2 
   Nonresidential  10.8  13.3  10.6  13.0  15.0 
   Residential    3.9    4.3    3.4    3.7    4.2 
     Total investment  16.8  23.7  12.4  18.2  21.3 
Components of saving
c           
Foreign
d    2.6    9.0    8.6    3.7    1.3 
National  13.3  11.5    3.6  13.6  18.3 
   Public sector
e  11.5    9.3   -2.4    2.8    3.6 
   Copper and oil funds    0.0    0.0    0.0    1.9    1.9 
   Private pension funds    0.0    0.3    1.9    2.6    3.3 
   Private
f    1.8    1.9    4.2    6.3    9.6 
     Total saving  15.9  20.5  12.2  17.2  19.6 
a. Saving data cover 1990-91 period. 
b. Percent of GDP, 1977 prices.  
c. Percent of GDP, current prices.  
d. Equals the current acco unt deficit. 
e. Equals the general government, public firms, and Central Bank, net of the Copper and oil funds.  
f. Calculated as a residual. 
Source: Marfan/Bosworth (1994, p. 186) . 
 
IV. 2. 3 Comparison of Rates of Return 
An important and  – maybe  – decisive question is the comparison of the rates of return 
between the different schemes. At first view, the Chilean model comes off well: The average 
real rate of return of the new system (from 1981 through 1997) was around 12 percent, 
however, there was a differ ence of 3 percent between higher income groups and lower income 
groups (cf. Diamond, 1996, p. 73)
16. For a more detailed overview of the rates of return of 
 
16 Cf. also Diamond (1997, p. 288), where he argues that in Chile "over the first decade of their new ... pension 
system they found almost a 5-percentage point difference in the after -tax rate of return between the low earner 
and the top earner, because of the fixed position of charges".    
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different AFPs see Appendix B. The question whether such high rates are easy to get with 
high inflation rates, see Table 7, will not be discussed here. But also the growth rate of real 
GDP was on average 6 to 7 percent in this period. However, the development of real wages 
lagged behind. 
As argued above, normally the rate of return on equities (stocks) i n pension accounts (r) is 
higher than the implicit return in social security (g) (see Figure 9 and Table 10). However, 
some caveats should be taken into account: First, a part of the higher returns is a 
compensation for the higher risk (measured e.g. by th e standard deviation or the variance, 
s)
17; second, another part serves to finance the "unfunded" obligations of the pensioners, a 
burden that must always be carried! So, even when the private returns (r) exceed those of the 
social security system (g), the  interests of the recognition bonds as well as the old (social 
security) pensions have to be paid out of this difference. Thus, the question is whether the 
risk-adjusted rate of return of the privatized scheme
18 minus the necessary taxes is still higher 
than that of the social security system. Furthermore, as reported in Diamond (1998, pp. 50 -
57), depending on the chosen model (with more or less worker choice of portfolio) there may 
be significant administrative costs (and increased scope for very poor invest ment choices).  
Source: Leimer, ORS WP# 59, 1994; see Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes (1998, 143, Fig. 4-1). 
 
17 A standard deviation of 20.5% e.g. means that in every (individual) year there is a chance of 1 out of three that 
the real rate of return is below (9.4  – 20.5) – 11.1 percent or above (9.4 + 20.5) + 29.9 percent.  
18 There exist several methods to adjust the rate of re turn to risk. One "easy measure" is the "Sharpe ratio", which 
converts total returns to excess return by subtracting the risk -free rate, and then devides that result by the 
standard deviation or sigma, to get a measure of "reward per unit of risk". The "Tr eynor-ratio" adjusts excess 
returns for the capital asset pricing model's beta, to get a measure of the "reward to volatility".   
Figure 9: Estimated Real Internal Rates of Return on Social 
Security Contributions
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Table 10: Annual Inflation-adjusted Rates of Return of Stocks and Bonds (1926-1996) 
 
Asset 
 
Average Yield 
 
Standard Deviation (%) 
Real S&P 500  9.4  20.5 
Real Long Term government bond   2.4  10.5 
Real Interm. Term government bond   2.3  7.1 
Real Short Term T-bill  0.7  4.2 
Source: Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes (1998, p. 142, Table 4-5). Database: Ibbotsen & 
Associates 
 
IV.2.4 Effects on Labor Market Development 
Switching from a PAYG to a funded system and from a defined -benefit to a defined-
contribution system, which establishes a closer link between contributions and benefits, will 
improve the efficiency of the labor market
19. The Chilean reform reduced total  payroll taxes 
considerably, therefore reducing the cost of labor and thus encouraging employment creation. 
By relying on a capitalization scheme, the pension reforms also has reduced greatly  – if not 
eliminated – the effective taxes on labor. By reducing l abor market distortions and informal 
labor market activities, by encouraging formal labor market participation and payments of 
contribution, this will lead to a higher pension coverage of the population and therefore also 
to higher growth rates. However, t he multiplicity of the old Social Security funds (prior to 
1981) with frequent double counting makes it difficult to evaluate the labor market effects of 
the new system. The structure of the overlapping -generations model suggests to consider two 
different aspects of the labor market effects: on the one hand the labor supply of the young 
workers, on the other hand the retirement decision of the old generation.   
With regard to younger workers, the most important question is the potential rate of evasion, 
leading to a dependency rate higher than the demographic one, a higher required contribution 
rate, and, hence, a misallocation of labor to the informal sector, with a less productive 
technology. The rate of evasion to the informal sector in a funded DC system  will be smaller 
because of the closer link between benefits and contributions.  
Though it is difficult to compare pre - and post-1981 developments, preliminary evidence from 
Chile suggests (see Figure 10) that the ratio of actual contributors under the new a nd old 
pension schemes to the number of potential mandatory contributors has increased since 1982, 
 
19 In projections for the U.S., Feldstein/Samwick (1996) estimate that, in steady state, a fully funded DC system 
would reduce the deadweight loss from the payroll tax by 1% of GNP annually; see also Kotlikoff (1996). For 
Germany, Homburg/Richter (1990) estimate an annual efficiency gain of reducing the deadweight loss of about 
36 billion DM or 1.5 % of GNP.  
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reaching almost 100 percent. The ratio of contributors under the old and new schemes to all 
employed (i.e. to all potential contributors) has largely stabili zed since 1987 at around 60 
percent. The difference between the two ratios reflects a very low permanent take -up rate by 
the self-employed. As mentioned above, the self -employed prefer not to contribute constantly 
to the new scheme but to invest in educati on, housing, consumer durables, or their mostly 
small enterprises. Furthermore, the overall labor force participation rate has also increased by 
some 10 percentage points.   
"In summary, the new pension scheme seems to have been no obstacle for higher labor  market 
participation and may have generated a higher and more formal labor force participation of 
the dependently employed. As regards the self -employed, their voluntary contributions status 
in the new scheme may also have reduced informal labor market ac tivities" (Holzmann, 1996,  
p. 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, pp. 130, 131, 211).  
Holzmann (1996, p. 40, Figure 6). 
Data in 1998 until September. Employment Data in 1998 is estimated.  
Social security affects also the retireme nt decisions. Fully funded DC plans may mitigate the 
early-retirement effect because the costs of early -retirement are internalized. Thus there may 
be an incentive to continue working to raise lifetime income. Then the supply of 
(experienced) labor and output are both increased. However, the cost -effectiveness and the 
higher rate of return of the funded system may induce workers to spend some of their 
Figure 10: Coverage Under Old and New Pension Scheme
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increased income in leisure, taken in the form of early retirement. Unfortunately, there is no 
empirical evidence on this issue for Chile; however, estimates of the impact of changing 
social security on average retirement ages generally show small effects.  
 
IV. 3 Finance-theoretic Perspective and Development of Capital Markets 
IV. 3. 1 A General Finance-theoretic Perspective 
Under a finance-theoretic perspective the differences between fully -funded and PAYG 
systems almost disappear and dwindle to the difference in incentive effects
20. The investments 
of the AFPs are  – in the first step  – almost entirely in government bonds, only in the second 
step in private shares and bonds. In as much this leads to higher growth rates (via a reduction 
of capital costs of real investment) is unclear outside the "wonder world" of neoclassics. 
Furthermore, in the future the pension  funds will be decumulated because there is less demand 
unless future generations will have a higher individual marginal propensity to save. Thus, also 
in this respect the "biological rate of interest" (Samuelson, 1958) will be working.  
However, a natural  extension is a stochastic overlapping -generations model. In this setting, 
the government not only has to issue inflation -indexed bonds but wage-indexed bonds to 
mimic the wage-indexed social security benefits. Therefore, any proposal  – like the Chilean – 
with only traditional debt and a finite pay-off period is not neutral but "call for a significant 
redistribution from the transitional generations that pay off the debt to future generations" 
(Bohn, 1997, p. 202). Furthermore, to analyze alternative investm ent strategies (of the 
government or the AFPs), explicit assumptions about the sources of macroeconomic risk are 
needed. When there is only uncertainty about future productivity ("productivity shocks") then 
– given a Cobb-Douglas technology  – future output, wages, and capital income would be 
perfectly correlated. Baxter and Jermann (1997) have shown that capital and labor incomes 
are indeed highly correlated in the long run. Therefore: "Equities are a much more natural 
hedging instrument for a wage-indexed  social security system than government bonds. (Of 
course, wage-indexed securities would be even better from this perspective)" (Bohn, 1997, p. 
204). 
An interesting aspect are the effects of alternative AFP investments on capital markets. In 
principle one would expect that a pension fund to pay for the contributors' own future 
 
20 Behind this are the assumptions that the debt grows in expectation of the rate of population growth plus wage 
growth, and that the debt has the same contingent payments as Social Security benefits (e.g. wage indexation); 
cf. Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes (1998, p. 149) and Appendix C. In other words, the "gap between market 
returns on Social Security contributions is in effect a perpetual tax that is exactly equal to the initial net transfers 
in present value terms" (Bohn, 1997, p. 196).    
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retirement has no real effects. This "neutrality proposition" (see Bohn, 1997, p. 200) is 
narrower than Ricardian neutrality and it states only that such pension funds are virtually 
perfect substitutes for private savings. Abstracting from liquidity constraints  – and other 
imperfections of capital markets  – individual accounts are irrelevant for macroeconomic 
analysis. 
However, there are other effects relating to the development of capi tal markets and the 
relation to economic development. At least three opinions can be distinguished. First, the 
development of the real economic sector is the leading sector, and financial arrangements and 
the financial system satisfy this demand automatically. Second, there are economists who note 
that in economics the role of financial factors in economic growth and development may be 
badly over-stressed. This opinion sometimes ignores the financial system altogether. The third 
view  – following Joseph Schumpeter  – stresses the role of a well -functioning banking or 
credit system for the enhancement of technical progress by identifying and then financing 
innovative entrepreneurs. More generally, banks and other financial intermediaries play an 
important role  in financing as well as in controlling or supervising firms ("corporate 
governance") as long as capital markets are underdeveloped and/or not able to do this function 
by themselves. Or the liberalization and accelerated development of capital or financial 
markets will foster the efficiency of resource allocation.  
IV. 3. 2 Development of the Chilean Capital Markets 
There is some evidence that the level of financial system's development  – or the effectiveness 
of financial markets – has a great explanatory pow er for future growth rates, rates of capital 
accumulation and technical progress (cf. Levine, 1997). However, there is a debate how to 
measure the depth, liquidity and maturity of financial markets. Some indications are given by 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) who introduce financial market aspects in an endogenous 
growth model through an AK -technology, where A, the rate of return on capital, depends 
positively on the level of financial market intermediation:  . ; C K ) ( A t / K 0 > ¶ - ￿ = ¶ ¶ q q  
Here q is higher the less financial markets are repressed. Estimates suggest nonnegligible and 
statistically significant effects on the transitional growth rate of 0.5 to 3.1 percent per annum.   
Another simple endogenous growth model incorporating potential growth effects of fin ancial 
market developments is proposed by Holzmann (1996). This model "allows also for other 
effects since pension reform and financial market developments are usually surrounded by 
many other policy changes at macro- and microeconomic level" (ibid, p. 7).  
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Here a "financial market variable"  K is introduced, "measuring the depth, liquidity, and 
maturity of financial markets" (p. 9). This variable is positively related to the savings ratio 
(i.e. investment ratio in a closed economy) and to an efficiency varia ble which is responsible 
– besides an exogenously given rate of labor -augmenting technical change – for the change in 
technical progress. This efficiency variable depends "also on other variables traditionally 
quoted in the literature (such as level of exp ort orientation and share of education expenditure 
in the budget)" (ibid, p. 9).  
To test this model and the advanced hypothesis that pension funds should contribute to the 
deepening of financial markets, higher liquidity, enhanced competition, and better  risk 
allocation in financial markets (and hence significant growth effects), appropriate financial 
market indicators must be chosen (see Holzmann, 1996, pp. 11 sqq.): FIR (financial 
interrelation ratio) compares the range of financial instruments with net  wealth, approximated 
by the capital stock; FMR (financial intermediation ratio) compares the scope of financial 
instruments with the assets of the financial institutions. FIR -1/FMR-1 cover financial 
liabilities, enhanced by the assets of pension funds, mut ual funds, and insurance companies. 
FIR-2/FMR-2 follows a more traditional approach and covers both the asset and liability side 
of the financial market. These indicators "are similar in magnitude, but differ somewhat in 
their composition and thus in trend  ... The main difference is due to the scope of bank credits 
to the private sector (included in instrument measure 1)", which rose sharply up to 1982, but 
"decreased with the banking crisis" (p. 12).  
Specific stock market development indicators are used to  measure the impact on real 
economic activity: MCR (market capitalization ratio) equals the value of listed shares divided 
by GDP; VTR (total value traded ratio) measures the total value of shares traded on the stock 
market exchange divided by GDP; TOR (turnover ratio) equals the value of total shares 
divided by market capitalization; and SMI (stock market index) equals the average of these 
three indicators. 
Holzmann (1996) uses these financial market indicators as proxies for financial market 
deepening and liquidity. As indicators for competitiveness and risk allocation he suggests to 
use "asset mispricing", e.g. the systematic deviations of actual returns from those implied by 
reference models (e.g. capital asset pricing [CAP] and arbitrage pricing [AP] mo del).  
The results of Holzmann's study (1996) can be summarized as follows: "Essentially all 
investigated FMIs (Financial Market Indicators) exhibit a strong upward movement once the 
banking crisis of 1981-1983 has been solved ... The almost linear rise in the stock market  
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index (SMI), starting in 1985 corresponds to the year of the first participation of pension 
funds in stock market activities" (p. 14).  
The correlation of AFP assets and FMIs, and of AFP shares in total traded shares and MCR, is 
very strong (cf. Fig. 11). "This empirical evidence is consistent with the claim that pension 
funds made the financial markets deeper and more liquid" (p. 15).  
With regards to the contribution of pension funds to enhanced competitiveness and risk 
allocation, the available data only allow for a very cursory investigation. Figure 12 presents 
yearly data for the asset mispricing indicators based on AP, CAP and ICAP (international 
asset pricing model) and indicators of pension funds assets. "If pension fund activities 
improve the performance of the finance market, the mispricing should decrease with enhanced 
fund activities" (p. 15): The correlation shows the correct sign, is statistically significant at the 
5 percent error level, and ranges between  -0.27 and - 0.52. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the pension funds' activities have contributed to a more 
sophisticated financial market: they helped to develop indexed annuities, they are important 
providers of funds to key sectors such as mortgage bonds to housing finan ce, enterprise 
bonds, and increased holding of traded shares. Holzmann (1996, p. 15) cites also evidence 
that pension funds are operating efficiently. "In a competitive environment this may 
contribute indirect proof of the overall efficiency of the financi al system" (ibid).  
 
V. Intergenerational Redistribution and Risk-Sharing 
There is no such thing as a free lunch, therefore, any shift back from an unfunded PAYG to a 
fully-funded system is generally burdensome for the transitional generations 
Figure 11.  Pension Fund Assets and Financial Market Indices
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(intergenerational  redistribution). For a clear picture of this, see Figure 13 for a 
"generational balance" of the U.S.A. pension system. This is so because in a PAYG scheme 
the first generation(s) receive(s) a "gift" or benefits in excess of her (their) contribution  that 
future generations have to pay back
21.  
In a standard overlapping-generations model any increased redistribution from young workers 
to old retirees reduces the disposable income of young workers, reduces thus their need to 
save for old age income, and  hence raises the equilibrium rate of interest. This in turn may 
crowd out capital investment and bring the economy on a growth path with lower per capita 
income. Therefore, less redistribution from young to old will put the economy on a higher per 
capita income growth path!   
Furthermore, as Bohn (1997, p. 203) has observed, "reduced population growth per se has 
positive macroeconomic effects": Reduced population growth raises the capital -labor ratio 
which reduces the real return on capital while increasing  the wage rate. Hence, a slowdown in 
population growth tends to reduce interest rates and to raise per capita incomes.   
Source: Leimer (1994) tax increase balanced budget scenarion, and author's calculations.  
All figures are present values as of 1997; see  Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes (1998, p. 145, Fig. 
4-2). 
 
21 Cf. also the argument in note 18.  
Figure 13: Social Security Net Intercohort Transfers
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To assess the second bundle of problems related to  intergenerational  risk-sharing a 
stochastic overlapping-generations model seems to be the best tool for analyzing the 
allocation of macroeconomic risks across generations (see Appendix C). To use this model, 
however, it has to be calibrated and then simulations could be run (see for such an exercise 
Bohn (1997)). In an OLG-model the older generation owns all the wealth, so they bear all the 
capital risk. If the Social Insurance fund will balance the system when there is a downturn or 
upturn in the stock market by changing the taxes on the young workers and not by changing 
the benefits of the older generation, then this shifts capital -market risk from the  old to the 
young. This effectively lets the unborn young generation take a position in the current stock 
market. Private markets cannot accomplish this because it is impossible to write contracts 
with the unborn generation. Given that capital income is ris kier than labor income (see, 
however, note 1 of Appendix C) such a policy leads to more efficient intergenerational risk -
sharing. Here, however, the analyses will be less sophisticated, and touch only upon four 
different points. 
The first point to be raised is related to the "risk shifting" of the transition from a DB (defined 
benefit) to a DC (defined contribution) plan and from a public to a private system. This point 
relates to the "insurance function" of social security vs. private funds: It is of impor tance that 
the Chilean AFPs are rather "savings institutions" than insurers (they have to buy insurance 
e.g. for invalidity and survivors' benefits with insurance companies against a premium). 
Furthermore, while closing the individual account the balance c an be used to buy an annuity 
with a life insurance company or – as described above – to a phased withdrawal.   
However, this leads to the  second point which in turn has several facets. On the one hand, the 
incomplete liquidization (i.e. before normal retirement) tends to reduce the rate of 
participation of self-employed  – which are members of the AFPs on an optional basis. To 
save for a house or a commercial investment is more attractive for the young than 
participating in a pension scheme (cf. Gillion and Bonilla, 1992). On the other hand, allowing 
early withdrawal (see the Singapur scheme) leads to the problem that the balance will be 
consumed early, and then the individual may fall into the "poverty trap". As always, a 
possible solution is to allow early dissolving (or partial dissolving) only according to rules 
governing for example life insurance policy with a "dread disease" clause.  
Somehow related to this point is a  third problem, namely that the current systems of social 
insurance pay the benefits in the form of an annuity, which is indexed to inflation or wage 
income (or even both), providing insurance against living too long and against inflation (and 
against "relative poverty"). However, private markets for annuity insurance are (or may be)  
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plagued by adverse selection: those expecting to live longer are more likely to purchase 
annuities. To get around this problem two possibilities exist: First to mandate a national risk 
pool (i.e. not to allow insurers to use information about expected lifespan) or  requiring 
annuity purchase at a young age (cf. Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996, p. 364).  
The insurance against inflation (or even "relative poverty") is possible when the government  – 
as in the case of Chile – issues indexed bonds (indexed to inflation or  – even better – to wage 
income growth)
22. 
The fourth point to raise relates to poverty, i.e. the aim of social security to protect against 
poverty in old age (or even to secure  – e.g. as the German system  – a relative income position 
in retirement, cf. Hauser, 1999). Privatization of social security implies that a large part of 
income redistribution  – a characteristic of most social security systems  – is no longer 
possible. On the one hand, there is  intragenerational earnings insurance, and private systems 
will provide less of this type, because adverse selection is strong in "earnings insurance". In 
general, the benefit formula is structured to provide a higher rate of return to low lifetime 
earners than to high lifetime earners. "This is justified on the grounds  that a social insurance 
plan can pool over the entire population certain risks that are difficult to insure privately" 
(Geanakoplos/Mitchell/Zeldes, 1998, p. 154). This is true in particular for shocks of earnings, 
disability, unemployment, length of life, inflation and poverty. 
On the other hand, social insurance is also  intergenerational risk-sharing (because the bene-
fits of the current old are positively related to the earnings of the current young), and this is 
absent in private markets. Therefore, the  retirement income of the "working poor" is based no 
longer on a progressive social insurance benefit function. [As a side -remark: However, poor 
people die – on average – earlier than rich one, hence they could bequeath relatively more of 
their funds to their children!] However, the government could supplement the contributions of 
the poor  – either upon retirement (by a minimum pension) or earlier (by supplementing con -
tributions). Then the overall result depends very much upon the share of the poor populat ion. 
Before the reform, in Chile more than 90 percent of workers got only the minimum pension. 
Under the new system there are only little information available at the moment (see Table 11).  
In Chile, the minimum pension is not set as a constant fraction of  the minimum wage and is 
adjusted to inflation occasionally, its current level is 73 percent of the minimum wage and 
around 25 percent of the average wage. This level is, however, quite low! But as row 6 in 
 
 
22 It should, however, be noted that the privatized system offers new opportunities to hedge other household risks 
in private capital markets, and they confront less political risk.   
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Table 11 shows, the old ratio of age pension to a verage income raised from 27 percent in 
1983 to 44 percent in 1991 and then fell to 32 in 1998, and the early retirement pension ratio 
to average income fell from 90 percent in 1988 to 50 percent in 1998. The influence of the 
great recession of 1982/3 is clearly visible in these figures. In a certain sense, most of these 
pensioners live still "on the pockets of the state"!  
This proposition is supported by results of Marcel/Solimano (1994) with respect to income 
distribution: During the Pinochet administration (1974-1989) the income share of the lower 
two quintiles decreased by 1.5 percentage points compared to the period 1960 -1973, while the 
share of the highest quintile increased by 4.7 percentage points. Essentially, this change in the 
income distribution is due to the increase in unemployment after 1974, and the decrease of the 
real minimum wage. 
 
Table 11: Average Amount of Pensions Paid through the System (3) 
                (Data up to December each year, 1998-Ch$) 
 
Years  Old-Age  Early 
Retirement 
Total 
Disability(2) 
Real Average 
Imposable 
Income(4) 
Ratio Old-
Age/Real Av. 
Impos. Income 
Ratio Early 
Retirement/Real 
Av. Impos. Income 
1982      204,899  181,823     
1983  42,676    173,478  157,031  27,18%   
1984  47,205    143,663  143,177  32,97%   
1985  45,306    132,849  134,68  33,64%   
1986  53,052    131,095  145,914  36,36%   
1987  55,829    129,195  140,336  39,78%   
1988  63,135  138,402  135,187  154,569  40,85%  89,54% 
1989  70,443  121,595  135,187  167,638  42,02%  72,53% 
1990  70,881  125,979  132,556  174,272  40,67%  72,29% 
1991  80,674  137,229  138,109  181,898  44,35%  75,44% 
1992  84,327  141,909  137,818  192,981  43,70%  73,54% 
1993  82,427  141,326  134,894  209,358  39,37%  67,50% 
1994  86,978  148,969  137,601  220,885  39,38%  67,44% 
1995  88,677  146,872  139,252  234,317  37,84%  62,68% 
1996  87,671  145,725  132,743  244,997  35,78%  59,48% 
1997  88,805  141,791  127,859  259,142  34,27%  54,72% 
1998(1)  86,259  135,775  126,241  268,978  32,07%  50,48% 
(1) Data up to September 1998. 
(2) Does not include transitory Disability Pensions. 
(3) Excludes pensions corresponding to a first payment.  
(4) Corresponds to overall contributors (salaried and self -employed). 
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p. 214 and p. 224).  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions  
The Chilean pension reform and the subsequent "second -generation reforms" in other Latin-
American countries show that pension reforms are politically feasible and successful. (For  
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summaries see e.g. James (1997); Mitchell/Barreto (1997); and Queisser (1999). However, 
their economic benefits have been overestimated.  
(Partial) privatization of classical PAYG social security systems, combined with funded 
individual pensions, have certainly different positive effects on the economy. First of all, this 
reform may lead to a separation of pensions, contributions and (individua l or institutional) 
wealth from current political decisions. However, politicians as well as trade unionists will 
find very quickly new political fields which they can concentrate their efforts. Second, this 
reform may increase efficiency of labor markets  because the distorting effects of contributions 
will be lower. This in turn may increase economic growth. Third, because of increasing 
(private) savings, capital accumulation and hence growth rates tend to increase. Fourth, this 
reform may have great positive effects for the development of capital markets which has itself 
positive effects on economic growth. In all these aspects, the Chilean reform model has done 
well. However, these advantages are mixed up with the effects of the total reform programme 
(e.g. in Chile). A direct discrimination is therefore very dificult. The Chilean reform, 
however, shows that most of the positive effects are connected with raising the retirement age. 
A second effect on savings is caused by the big savings effort of the Chil ean government and 
the tax increases to finance the pension system reform.  
These advantages must be confronted with the costs  – not to mention the political questions: 
Privatized annuities have remarkably higher administration and selling costs than traditional 
(DB) systems. And there are some intriguing aspects of adverse selection (cf. Diamond 
(1998); NASJ (1998); Murthi/Orszag/Orszag (1999). 
To summarize, Chile instituted a two-pillar system, a first pillar paying a guaranteed 
minimum pension, and a second mandatory pillar offering a private DC account. The first 
pillar is financed with general tax revenue. The minimum benefit level is independent of the 
contribution amount, however, eligibility depends  – in order to reduce moral hazard that 
otherwise might induce evasion  – on both age and years of membership in the new system. 
For the second pillar Chile uses payroll taxes, and older workers were given some "credit" in 
the form of recognition bonds for contribution under the old system.   
With regard to the Chilean reform, the new Chilean AFP system has strengths and 
weaknesses (see Vittas, 1995) to take into account as lessons for other countries 
contemplating similar reforms:  
•  The system emphasizes personal responsibility and the direct link between contr ibutions 
and benefits. It is simple and transparent.    
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•  However, the great discrepancy between the number of affiliates and the number of active 
contributors seems to be a great problem not guaranteeing universal coverage.  
•  Adding the contributors to the old  system, the total coverage of the Chilean pension 
system rose from 53 percent of total employment to 65 percent in 1995. The relatively low 
"coverage" is one of the most important weaknesses of the system. It can be explained, 
however, by the great informa l sector of the labor market, the small number of self -
employed in the AFPs, and the (still existing) moral hazard created by the government 
guarantee of minimum pensions.  
•  The state guarantees with respect to the minimum pension and the minimum rate of re turn 
as well as the inflation-proofness are nevertheless remarkable features.  
•  Despite this minimum level, the relationship between workers' private account 
accumulation and what happens to these accounts in the event of disability, death, or very 
low income on old age is still open. In this case, most of the accumulation is done in early 
years with the result that, e.g. the costs weigh higher (cf. Diamond, 1998, p. 54).  
•  Furthermore, the level of the minimum pensions seems to be too low to secure a decent 
life during retirement. It is only targeted at about 25 percent of the average wage. 
Furthermore, how many workers will retire with the minimum pension is still an open 
question. 
•  Even this emaciated first pillar may imply that government sector liabilities can prove to 
be too high compared to the tax base. Therefore, the system's future financial viability has 
to be looked at carefully. 
•  The flexibility in moving in and out of individual AFPs is of great advantage, however, 
the high frequency leads to excessiv e marketing and administrative costs.  
•  The volume of the pension funds managed by AFPs has risen steadily from 10 percent of 
GDP in 1985 to more than 42 percent in 1997. The total amount of ressources of the funds 
reached US-$ 30 billion by the end of 1997. 
•  The tight investment rules and regulation of the AFPs solved some problems at the start. 
However, the rule to build only one fund per AFP and one account per worker hinder the 
diversity of the offers. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable difference in the  rate of returns 
between low life-time earners and high life-time earners before and after tax.  
•  Three major forces have driven the portfolio composition of the pension funds: the 
evolution of investment limits, the increase in the size of the pension funds , and the 
development of domestic capital markets as well as new investment instruments.   
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•  The average rate of return of the pension funds portfolio has reached 12 percent in real 
terms (with great fluctuations, however). Whether this is "exceptionally good"  is difficult 
to say in a period of high inflation, high growth rate, and high real interest rates and 
starting financial development. In a certain sense, these high rates reflect the good 
economic circumstances. Since 1995, the situation has changed, on t he one hand because 
of the Mexican crisis, on the other hand because of the significant fall in the terms of trade 
(e.g. copper prices). Therefore, it is not yet clear how much this reflects good investment 
opportunities, and how much it reflects greater r isk and excess demand for limited 
domestic assets (i.e. most portfolios have shares of only a very small group of companies; 
cf. Edwards, 1996, p. 15). 
It is more difficult to evaluate the macro -economic benefits with regards to the impact on 
private savings, overall economic efficiency, and the development of capital markets.  
•  The direct effect of the pension reform on household saving is difficult to ascertain 
because the pension reform was part of a thorough -going economic reform.   
Furthermore, the impact depends upon the way the transition period is financed: If it is not 
financed by debt this means an increase in taxes on current generations; there maybe also 
a fall in consumption; besides this the contribution rate fell from 22 percent to 13 percent 
raising consumption. So overall, whether the reform has increased private savings, is still 
an open question. However, the increase found by some research is not very significant.    
•  With respect to overall economic efficiency the same reasoning applies: Chile  achieved 
better growth performance than her neighbours in the late 80s and 90s. However, only part 
of it may be attributed to the pension reform.   
•  The accumulation of pension funds and their investment in financial markets has led e.g. 
to the development  of a housing market and a private market for mortgage bonds. 
Furthermore, the insurance markets have flourished, leading to a fall in premium rates. 
The pension funds also contributed to the privatization of public enterprises. Their 
investments led to bet ter performance in stock and other financial assets markets. And 
new financial instruments have been introduced to meet the growing demand of pension 
funds. 
The Chilean example and other reforms not only in Latinamerica, but also in Europe (cf. 
Gern, 1998), have shown that reforms of Social Security are possible and politically feasible. 
However, one should not expect "economic miracles".  
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Appendix A: A Short Review of the Development of the AFP Industry 
I. 
The number of functioning AFPs in the market increased from 12 in 1981 over 21 in 1993, 
and then a merger process took place resulting in 8 AFPs in 1999. Between these years, 
different changes took place (see Superintendency, 1999, pp. 112 sqq.).  
The 12 starting pension funds were Alameda, Concordia,  Cuprum, El Libertador,  Habitat, 
Invierta, Magister, Planvital, Provida, San Cristóbal,  Santa Mariá, and Summa, of which the 
AFPs in italics s till exist. 
Up to 1985, the number remained unchanged, when Alameda and San Cristóbal merged, 
forming Union. In 1983 and 1987, two legal reforms to change DL 3500 were enacted, which 
influenced in different ways the entry barriers of AFPs to the industry.  In 1983, the required 
cash reserve was reduced from 5 to 1% of the administrated pension funds. In 1987, the 
minimum equity capital for establishing an AFP was lowered from 20 million UF (equivalent 
to US-$ 631,345) to 5 million UF (US-$ 157,836). 
Starting from these changes, the number of AFPs changed in the following way:  
•  In 1986, 1988 and 1990,  Protección, Futuro and Bannuestro entered the industry; 
however, Bannuestro was wound up in the following year.  
•  In 1992, six AFPs began operating: Banguardia,  Bansander, Fomenta, Laboral, Previpan 
and Qualitas. 
•  During 1993, three AFPs joint the market:  Aporta, Genera and Norprevisión (which 
changed its name to Valora). In the same year, Invierta and  Planvital merged. 
•  In 1994, Armoniza initiated operations, but Labo ral was wound up. 
•  In 1995, Provida and El Libertador merged as well as  Santa Mariá and Banguardia, and 
Qualitas and Previpan merged with Valora. During the same year, Genera was wound up.  
•  In 1996, three mergers took place:  Planvital merged with Concordia,  Magister with 
Futuro, and Valora with Armoniza called Qualitas.  
•  During 1998, four mergers have taken place:  Provida merged with  Union, Summa with 
Bansander, Magister with Qualitas, and finally  Aporta with Fomenta.   49
•  In January 1999 Provida merged with  Protección, so that in the year 1999 there existed 
only 8 AFPs (see also Table B1).    
 
II. 
Competition can take place on three different levels, in the relevant market itself and in the 
markets for subsitutes and in markets on a lower or higher level. In consequ ence, the working 
of competition in the market in a narrower sense cannot be judged appositely if not all these 
levels of economic activity are taken into account. In other words, one has to take into 
account at least also the market situation of suppliers  (e.g. life insurance companies, banks, 
brokerage firms; see Superintendency, 1999, pp. 118 sqq.).  
Furthermore, competition in a market (in a narrower sense) depends upon the growth rate of 
this market, of the industry, and of the macro economy. About the  macro economic 
development and the industry of financial intermediaris, some remarks are in the main text. 
The growth of the relevant market of AFPs was large in the beginning years when the number 
of affiliates grew rapidly: growth rates of affiliates wer e 10, 18 and 12% in the first 4 years, 
then decreased up to 1992/3 to 1 %, then 1993 to 1995 the growth rates were 5.5 % and 6.3 
%. Beginning with 1995 the market was almost saturated (see the figures in Table 4). 
According to the Superintendency (1999, p.  117) 5,959 affiliates (both salaried and self -
employed) joined the system in September 1998 while 59,854 affiliates changed from one 
AFP to another during that same month.  
Also, barriers to entry or to exit a market play a significant role for competition . However, 
neither absolut cost advantages (e.g. in acquiring capital via close connections to a large bank) 
nor economies of scale or scope are of importance in this industry. Therefore, only advantages 
of product differentiation may be of relevance. Thes e advantages are related to preferences of 
customers for known products, or to brand loyalty which can be built up by marketing and 
other services. Important advantages can also result from distribution channels or networks. 
These investments are product s pecific and can be viewed as sunk costs in case of a market 
exit. Hence, this exit barrier is an entry barrier for newcomers. However, the partial or total 
buying of the stock of contracts by mergers and acquisitions or of the distribution network are 
possible. This can be seen clearly in this industry after the legal barriers to entry have been 
lowered in 1983 and 1987.   50
Competition can be carried through with three different means: price, product (or quality) and 
preferences. In highly regulated markets, p rices (i.e. contribution) and products (e.g. through 
rate of return regulation and limits to investments) are almost irrelevant. Furthermore, the 
commission structure of AFPs and the consequences for the individual rate of return are  – 
even for experts  – not transparent. In those situations, the "fight for clients" goes via 
"services" or selling efforts, taking into account that transferring from one AFP to another 
does not imply any direct cost for the affiliates.  
 
III.  
Taken together, these arguments sup port the hypothesis that the market concentration will 
first decrease and then  – after the market reaches a certain degree of maturity  – will increase. 
To verify this hypothesis, the Herfidahl Index is used
1
. This index (H(y)) shows clearly a 
decrease from 0,216 to 0,125 in 1994. From 1995 the Herfindahl index (H(y)) increases. This 
is also true for H(x) which measures the concentration by contributors: From 1990 this index 
decreases from 0,203 to 0,178 in 1994, and then increases up to 0,207. Therefore, th e 
hypothesis seems to be supported.   
Given an observed value of H=H, one can ask, how many firms of equal size would be 
necessary to generate the same level of concentration. This number is called "equivalent 
number" of firms and is given by N=1/ H. This number allows comparisons among different 
markets at a given point in time, and may suggest whether a given market is becoming more 
or less concentrated. The results are given in Table A1. The numbers show that at the highest 
eight equally large firms (with  a market share of about 12.5 percent) could have served the 
market giving the same decree of concentration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The Herfindahl Index is defined by  ￿ =
2 ] Q / q [ H i , i=1, ...,n, where q i is "output" of firm i, Q is total 
"output" of the industry, the refore qi/Q is the "market (net) share" of firm i, n is the number of firms in the 
industry.   51
Table A1: Market Concentration per No. of Contributors
1 and Size of Pension Fund
2 
 
 
Year
Herfindahl-Index 
H(x) (percent of 
contributors)
Herfindahl-Index 
H(y) (percent of 
pension funds)
1/H(x) 1/H(y)
1981 n/a 0,216 n/a 4,6       
1982 n/a 0,194 n/a 5,2       
1983 n/a 0,18 n/a 5,6       
1984 n/a 0,171 n/a 5,8       
1985 n/a 0,179 n/a 5,6       
1986 n/a 0,182 n/a 5,5       
1987 n/a 0,178 n/a 5,6       
1988 n/a 0,172 n/a 5,8       
1989 n/a 0,167 n/a 6,0       
1990 0,203 0,158 4,9        6,3       
1991 0,184 0,147 5,4        6,8       
1992 0,181 0,136 5,5        7,4       
1993 0,182 0,13 5,5        7,7       
1994 0,178 0,125 5,6        8,0       
1995 0,181 0,131 5,5        7,6       
1996 0,184 0,134 5,4        7,5       
1997 n/a 0,139 n/a 7,2       
1998 0,207 0,166 4,8        6,0       
1999 n/a 0,208 n/a 4,8       
1 Corresponds to the number of active affiliates who contributed in September,  
for remunerations earned in prior months.
2 In Millions of September 1998-US$.
Annual data from 31 December of the respective year, except for 1998 (September).
Source: Superintendency of AFPs (1999, p.116), http://www.safp.cl,
             Superintendencia de AFP, No.2 (1981-1996); (1997, p. 85) and own calculations.  52
Concentration can be measured also by concentratio n ratios, e.g. the market share of the 
biggest company (CR1), of the three biggest (CR3) or the five biggest (CR5) or the ten 
biggest companies (CR10). When we take N, the equivalent number of firms, and divide the 
total "output" by this number, then resul ts the market share of the "equivalent" firm. A (e.g. 
fivefold) multiple of this "equivalent market share"  – called the equivalent concentration ratio 
(ECR) – can be compared with the actual (e.g. five firm) concentration ratios. The results of 
this comparison are shown in Table A2.  
 
Table A2. Concentration Indices and Equivalent Concentration Ratios (for 1998)  
 
CR 1 23,52%
CR 3 61,42%
CR 5 85,51%
CR 10 100,00%
ECR 1 16,60%
ECR 3 49,80%
ECR 5 83,00%
Data Source: Superintendency (1999, p. 115). 
Own calculations.
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Appendix B: The Rates of Return of the AFPs 
The figures given on page 15 (and Figure 5) reflect the rate of return (of a share
1
) deflated by 
UF (unit of account = unidad de fomento) as measured by the Superintendency of Pension 
Funds Administrators (cf. Su perintendency, 1999, pp. 151 -152). Even this rate fluctuates very 
much: between 30.9 percent in 1991 to  -2.6 percent in 1995. Although, the average rate 
amounts to 11.0 percent (over the years 1981 to 1998), the standard deviation is 9.36, 
meaning that in  two out of three cases the rate of return can be either 20.36 or 1.64 percent.  
However, this aggregated (and weighted) average hides fluctuations within the year as well as 
between the different Pensions Funds. Table B1 gives an overview of the yearly rate s of 
return of the AFPs, the unweighted and the weighted average.  Also, the standard deviations 
and the coefficients of variation are calculated.  
In any year, the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation are relatively small 
indicating that th ere seems to be an "uniform investment strategy". This may be the result of 
the "minimum rate of return" regulation
2
, because fund managers who deviate too far from the 
industry's average get "penalized" if downward and not appropriately rewarded if upward  
deviations occur. This is evidenced in Table B2 which shows the diversification of the 
investment portfolios of the AFPs for 1998. The only "real" difference can be seen in the 
partition of bonds and other fixed -income securities between government and co rporate, but 
not between stocks and bonds.  
Furthermore, the last three rows of Table B1 show that the performance of the individual AFP 
over the years, despite some relaxation with regards to investment limits, is also very similar: 
it fluctuates between 11.4 (Cuprum) and 10.5 percent (Provida) for those AFPs which are 
working from the beginning.   
                                                          
1
 "The Pension Fund is expressed in a unit of measurement known as 'share' ... Changes in the value of the share 
reflect the yield of the investments of Pension Funds" (Superintendency, 1999, p. 151, note 61).  
2
 The real rate of return of the AFP must not be  lower than the lesser of (1) the average real rate of return of all 
AFPs in the last 12 months minus 2 percentage points, and (2) 50 percent of the average real rate of return of all 
AFPs in the last 12 months. If there is an "excess return" this must be p laced in a fluctuation reserve, from which 
funds are drawn in case the return falls below the minimum rate. If this reserve plus the cash reserve (1% of total 
assets) are not high enough, the government makes up the difference and the AFP is wound up.      54
Table B1: Real (UF) Rates of Return of AFPs, 1982-1998 
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1982  29,8  30,1  25,4  23,1  25,6  25  27,6  24,4  29,5  27,5  30,2  28                     
1983  21,4  24,7  18,5  20,2  24,4  20,7  20,5  22,2  20,3  20,7  20,9  22,5                     
1984  4,4  2,1  3,2  3,3  2,7  3,4  5  3,5  4  3,9  3  2,8                     
1985    13  13,7  13,2  13,3  13,3  13,5  13  13,5    13  14,3  13,6                   
1986    12,7  15,5  13,5  12,5  11,9  12,4  11,5  11,8    11,8  12,4  13,4  10,6                 
1987    4,8  8,5  5,8  5,5  5,5  4,5  5,2  5,1    5,1  5,2  6,3  7                 
1988    7,3  7,8  6,9  6,4  8,7  7,1  7,2  6,3    5,9  6,4  7,1  7,7                 
1989    7  9,5  8,2  6,8  9,1  6,9  8,9  5,9    6,5  7,3  8,7  8,2  4               
1990    16,2  18,2  16,6  15,9  19,4  15,8  18,7  13,3    14,6  18,1  17,2  17,7  17               
1991    28,7  30,4  30,8  30,4  27,9  34,3  32  25,8    30,1  33,1  30,9  32,7  31,2               
1992    2,8  3,6  3,4  2,8  0,9  3  3,6  3,1    2,9  3  2,8  4,2  4,1               
1993    16,7  16,1  16,3  15,9    16,7  17  15,9    16,3  16,9  16,4  16,8  14,6      15  15,8      14,9
1994    18,6  19,5  17,5  18,1    18,2  19,9  17,9    18  17,1  18,5  18,8  17,2      15,7  18,8  21,1  17,4  18,8
1995    -2,4  -1,8    -2,8    -3,3  -2,6  -2,5    -3,3  -2,1  -2,6  -2,1  -4,6  -2,6  -3,1    -2  -2,8     
1996      3,6    3,8    3,5  3,3  3,4    3,7  3,2  3,5  3,5    4,1      3,3  2,9     
1997      4,3    5,7    4,4  4,7  4,6    4,5  4,7  4,6  4,7    3,9      3,8  6,2     
1998      -2,7    0,4    -1,4  -1  -0,1    -0,8  -1,9    -2,1    -1,9             
Mean 
 
  13,02  11,4  13,75  11,0  13,3  11,1  11,3  10,5    10,73  11,2  10,8  9,82  11,9  0,88      7,94  6,85     
St. 
Dev. 
  9,74  9,08  7,87  9,28  8,5  9,87  9,44  8,83    9,62  9,95  8,43  9,25  10,9  3,14      7,96  8,83     
St. D. 
/Mean 
  0,75  0,8  0,57  0,84  0,64  0,89  0,84  0,84    0,9  0,89  0,78  0,94  0,91  3,58      1  1,29     
 
 
Source: Superintendencia de AFP, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.  
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Table B2: Investment Portfolio Diversification by Type of Instrument and AFP, 1998 
 
       Total Portfolio       
          Bonds and other        
    Stocks         Fixed-Income Securities     
AFP  Chilean  Non-  Total   Govern-  Corpo-  Non-  Total   Others  Cash and 
    Chilean  Stocks  ment  rate  Chilean  Bonds    Equi- 
                  valents 
Aporta                   
  Fomenta  12.89  0.00  12,89  38.90  41.58  1,35  81.83  5.25  0.03 
Cuprum  15.40  0.00  15.40  44.88  31.25  5,50  81.63  2.89  0.08 
Habitat  14.91  0.01  14.92  43.87  34.46  4,48  82.81  1.74  0.53 
Magister  17.03  0.00  17,03  33.54  41.97  1,56  77.01  5.52  0.38 
Planvital  15.61  0.00  15.61  40.26  36.28  4,46  81.00  3.07  0.32 
Protección  14.68  0.00  14.68  34.18  42.34  5.97  82.49  2.81  0.02 
Provida  14.72  0.00  14.72  38.31  36.62  6.82  81.75  3.37  0.16 
Santa Maria  14.73  0.00  14.73  39.81  36.01  6.12  81.94  3.29  0.04 
Summa                   
 Bansander  14.68  0.00  14.68  43.29  33.03  6.00  82.32  2.98  0.02 
Mean  14.90  0.00  14.90  40.96  35.44  5.63  82.03  2.88  0.19 
Variance    1.18  0.00    1.18  16.05  16.38  3.96  2.95  1.45  0.04 
1 As a percentage of total Portfolio assets.  
Source: Superintendencia de AFP, Bulletino Estadistico, no. 148 (1999), pp. 221 -223.  
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B3: Pension Funds Portfolio Evolution  
 
 
 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Government 28,10% 26,00% 44,50% 42,10% 42,40% 46,60% 41,40% 35,40% 41,50% 44,10% 38,30% 49,90%
61,90% 26,60% 2,70% 12,20% 20,40% 22,90% 27,40% 28,50% 20,80% 16,30% 11,70% 9,40%
Mortgage Bonds  9,40% 46,00% 50,70% 42,90% 35,20% 25,50% 21,30% 20,60% 17,70% 16,10% 13,40% 14,20%
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,60% 0,40% 0,30% 0,70% 1,00% 0,70% 1,10% 1,50% 1,60%
Corporate Stocks 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 3,80% 6,30% 8,10% 10,10% 11,30% 23,80% 24,00%
Corporate Bonds 0,60% 0,60% 2,20% 1,80% 1,10% 0,80% 2,60% 6,40% 9,10% 11,10% 11,10% 9,60%
Shares of Investment Funds 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,20%
Foreign Instruments 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Cash 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,50% 0,50% 0,10% 0,40% 0,00% 0,00% 0,10% 0,10% 0,10%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1In percentage up to December of each year.
Source: Superintendencia de AFP (1997, p. 63).
Deposits and Papers of 
Financial Institutions
Bonds and equities of 
Financial Institutions
Instruments 
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Appendix C:  An Overlapping-Generations-Model with Different Pension 
    Systems (and Uncertainty)
1 
 
The model follows the structure of the OG -model of Blanchard and Fisher (1989, chap. 3). In 
particular three questions will be analyzed here: First, the in troduction of a fully funded 
pension system and its effects on private savings. Second, the effects of a transition from a 
PAYG to a FF system on private savings; third, the welfare implications of the repayment of 
the implicit debt of the existing pension  system, and the burden of the transition period.   
All of these problems are analyzed under the favourable assumption, that the market rate of 
return of capital is higher than the natural rate of growth (i.e. productivity growth plus 
population growth) or  equivalently labor income growth. 
 
I.  The Basic Model 
 
The economy consists of individuals and firms. The  individuals live for two periods and 
consume c1,t in their first period of life, and c 2,t+1 in their second period of life. Since there is 
uncertainty with respect to the future, the utility of an individual over his "life cycle" is  
), c ( u ( E ) c ( u t , t , 1 2 1 +
- + +
1 ) 1 q  
with q > 0 as the subjective time discount rate, E the expectations operator, and u` > 0, and   
u'' < 0. 
The individuals work only in their first life period: They offer (one unit of) labor inelastically 
and receive the wage w t > 0. They consume part of their labor income and save the remainder, 
invest their savings to finance their consumption in their second life period.  
The savings of the "young workers" i n period t built up the capital stock, which is used in 
period t+1 together with labor supplied by the new young workers. The number of individuals 
born at the beginning of period t and working in this period is N t. The growth of the (working) 
population is given exogenously with the rate n, so that N t=(1+n)
tN0. The growth factor of 
aggregate (labor) income is hence  t t t t t N w / N w G ￿ ” + + + 1 1 1 . 
The  firms act competitively and produce outpout using a neoclassical production function 
(i.e. the INADA conditions ap ply). Output per worker is then given by y t=f(kt), with kt 
measuring the capital-labor-ratio or capital per head. The firms take the wage rate and the 
rental price (cost) of capital (r t) as exogenously given while maximizing their profits. 
The maximization problem of a representative individual is hence: 
Max  ) c ( u E ) c ( u t , t , 1 2 1 +
- + +
1 ) (1 q  
s.t.  t t t , w s c = + 1  
). r (1 s c 1 t t 1 t 2, + + + =  
Denoting by  t V the utility obtained by solving the above problem, the first order condition is  
                                                 
1 To introduce uncertainty in an interesting sense is beyond the scope of this Appendix. Therefore it is assumed 
that there are productivity shocks that have common effects (e.g. with a Cobb -Douglas technology) on output, 
wages, and capital income, i.e. all these variables are perfectly  correlated. Therefore, there is no advantage of 
risk sharing between generations. Furthermore, when the productivity shocks are identically and independently 
distributed, this is also true for the exogeneous as well as for the endogeneous variables. In par ticular, the 
savings propensity is independent of time and of the state of nature. See, however, Bohn (1997).   
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(1)       0 1 ) (1 ) 1 1 t
1 = + + + - - = + +
- )) r ( u'(s r ( E ) s w ( ' u
dc
dV
t t t t
t
t
1 q  
implicitly giving the following "savings function": 
(2)         ), r , w ( s s t t t 1 + =    
where 0 < sw  < 1, but the sign of s r is ambiguous because of the opposite income and 
substitution effect. 
The result of the maximation problem of the firms yields th e following first-order conditions 
(3)  t t t t w ) k ( ' f k ) k ( f = - -   
and              . r ) k ( ' f t t =     
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that demand for and supply of goods are equal or 
equivalently that the demand for capital by firms equals the supply of capital by consumers 
, K ) r , w ( s N K K t t t t t t - ￿ = - + + 1 1  
where the left hand side shows net -investment as a change in the capital stock, and the right 
hand side shows the savings of the young generation minus the de -savings of the old. 
Eleminating kt and division by Nt results in 
(4)  ). r w ( s k ) n ( t , t t 1 1 + + = + 1  
 
II.  An Economy with a Fully Funded Pension System 
 
In a fully funded pension system, the state (or the pension funds) collect in period t the 
premium dt from the young workers and invests the sum in the capital stock. In the sa me 
period the funds pay pensions to the retirees b t=(1+rt)dt-1 whose premium were invested in 
period t-1. Equations (1) and (4) now change as follows:  
(5)      0 )) r )(1 d s (( ' u ) ( ( E )) d s ( w ( ' u 1 t t t t t t = + + + + - + - + +
-
1 t
1 r 1 ) 1 q  
(6)            . k ) n ( d s t t t 1 + + = + 1        
A comparison between eq. (1) and (2) and eq.  (5) and (6) shows that when k t fulfils these eq. 
then it fulfils also those eq., as long as d t < (1+n)kt+1.  
Proposition 1: As long as the premium of a fully funded pension systems is not higher than 
the voluntary savings which would exist when there is no  pension system, the 
introduction of a fully funded system does not change the level of privat 
savings. 
All individuals receive the same rate of return on the premium as well as on their savings, 
therefore, they are indifferent towards the allocation betwe en st and dt. They adjust only their 
"voluntary" saving s to take into account the "forced savings" d.   
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III.  An Economy with a PAYG Pension System 
In a pay-as-you-go pension system the income in period one diminishes by  t, the payroll tax 
rate paid into the (social insurance) pension fund, resulting in a pension b t in the second 
period. This tax rate is non-distortionary since the labor supply is inelastically given. 
Furthermore, there is no public borrowing, i.e. the systems pays for itself: By paying  t w t an 
individual acquires a claim against an equal share of next generation's income, i.e.   
1 1 1 + + + = t t t t t G w N / N w t t . Hence, the pensions paid in period t are equal to the premium paid 
in this period: bt = (1+n)dt, when the premiums of the y oung workers to the pension fund 
remain constant over time  – the condition in a steady state  –, then the interest rate is (only) n 
and not r. Therefore, the constraints of the maximation problem now read as follows:  
t t t , w ) ( s c t - = + 1 1  
                  ) w s ( w c t t t t , t + - = 1  
                           1 1 2 1 + + + + = t t t t ,t G w ) r ( s c t . 
However, when there is no wage increase, the growth factor is simply (1+n). Hence, eq. (1) 
and (4) change as follows: 
(7)    0 1 1 (1 ) 1
1 = + + + + + - + - + + +
- n)) ( d ) r ( )u'(s r ( E )) d s ( w ( ' u t t t t t t t 1 1 1 q  
(8)        . k ) n ( ) d , r , w ( s t t t t 1 t 1 + + + = 1    
It is easy to show that the rate of savings as well as the capital stock per head are decreasing 
functions of the necessary premium rate. To show this, differentiate eq. (7) with respect to the 
premium (assuming that dt = dt+1) and holding the wage rate and interest ra te constant: 
(9)        0.
(1 ) (1
r)(1 (1 ) 1
1 ' '
1
1 ' '
1 <
+ + +
+ + + +
- =
¶
¶
-
-
' '
' '
t
t
u ) r u
u ) n ( E u
d
s
2
2
2
q
q
  
Differentiation of eq. (8) holding k t constant results in  
(10)         
' ' f s n
d / s
d
k
r
t t
t
t
- +
¶ ¶
=
¶
¶ +
1
1 < 0. 
The numerator is negative, the denominator is positive when there is a unique and stable 
equilibrium (see Blanchard/Fisher, 1987, pp. 95 sqq.). This leads to  
Proposition 2: Introducing a PAYG pension system reduces both private savings and the 
stock of capital per head.   
 
IV: Transition: Replacing an Unfunded with a Fully Funded Pension  
       System 
Suppose now that a PAYG  system is replaced by a fully funded system. Then the government 
has an obligation to pay the pensions of the current generation of retirees. This "debt" is 
financed by borrowing from the new young generation of workers at the market rate of 
interest. The  value of this obligation is unaffected by the change of the system, therefore, the 
amount the state borrows per worker (z t) must be the same as the premium every young  
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worker had to pay under the old PAYG system (d t). Assuming that the interest rate is 
unaffected by this system's change, eq. (1) and (4) become  
(11)      0 1 ) 1 ) 1
1 = + + + + - + - + +
- ) ) r ( z u'((s r ( ( E )) z s ( w ( ' u t t t t t t t 1 1 q  
(12)            . k ) n ( s t t 1 + + = 1      
Assuming dt = dt+1, eq. (7) and (8) are identical to eq. (11) and (12) except that the portion of 
savings going to finance the consumption  of the current generation of retirees now earnes a 
rate of return of r t+1, rather than n. This increase (throughout it is assumed that r > n) generates 
a pure income effect that will tend to decrease current period savings.  
Proposition 3: The transition from an unfunded PAYG pension system to a fully funded 
pension system generates an immediate income effect that lowers private 
savings. 
The state (or the pension funds) has to refloat continuously this debt, when there is no "fiscal 
consolidation". Hence, to  repay in period t+1 the amount borrowed in period t, the state has to 
borrow z t+1  = zt(1+rt+1)/(1+n) from each young worker in period t+1. The first -order 
conditions change to   
(13)    )) r )( z s (( ' u ) r ( E )) z s ( w ( ' u t t t t t t t 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 + + + +
-
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Assuming r > n, the debt per worker increases in every period, hence the savings for capital 
accumulation will (in partial equilibrium) decrease resulting in a reduced capital stock (in 
each future period relative to what it would otherwise have been). Eq. (13) shows that  the 
increases in z are fully offset by decreases in s, until voluntary savings disappear (given that 
individuals are indifferent between buying government bonds and investing in capital stock).  
However, this is a partial equilibrium result, because the interest rate was held constant. When 
the capital stock falls, the interest rate will increase and the wage rate will decrease, both 
trends will influence the level of savings.  
The answer is obtained by differentiating eq. (14) with respect to z t+1, to obtain 
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As before (see eq. 10) the numerator is negative and the denominator positive when  0 ‡ r s  so 
that the equilibrium is unique and stable. Hence, an increase in government borrowing per 
worker decreases the stock  of capital in equilibrium.  
Proposition 4: Financing the transition (only) by borrowing (e.g. by "recognition bonds") 
leads to a growing debt per head since z t increases at the rate (1+r)/(1+n). 
Furthermore, the decrease of the capital stock will lead to a n increase in the 
interest rate and generate additional savings, in the end the explosive path of z t 
will exhaust output. Therefore, some adjustment in the fiscal balance will be 
required to ensure stability of the economy.  